股权激励计划对国有企业创新的影响研究

李连伟; 纪骁鹏; 吕镯; 郭园园

doi:10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.09.018

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科研管理 ›› 2024, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (9) : 175-183. DOI: 10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.09.018

股权激励计划对国有企业创新的影响研究

李连伟 ¹ ,
纪骁鹏 ¹ ,
吕镯 ² ,
郭园园 ¹

作者信息 +

Research on the impact of equity incentive plan on promoting innovation of state-owned enterprises

Author information +

文章历史 +

摘要

提高国有高层次人才与企业创新水平是实施创新驱动发展战略和推动经济高质量发展的重要微观基础。本文以2006—2021年期间的A股国有控股上市公司为样本,采用逐年倾向得分匹配法和多期双重差分模型,实证检验了股权激励计划对国有企业创新活动的影响。研究结果显示,实施股权激励计划显著提高了国有企业研发投入,并且在股票流动性低、行业竞争程度高、混改程度高以及处于成熟期的国有企业表现更为显著;机制检验表明,股权激励计划主要通过提高企业内部控制质量和高管风险承担水平以及克服高管短视化倾向来提高国有企业研发投入;进一步研究发现,股权激励计划主要提高了国有企业探索性创新,而非开发性创新,同时也提高了国有企业创新效率与创新产出,并表现为“量质齐升”的创新策略。本文从股权激励的角度丰富了国有企业创新的激励机制研究,并从企业创新的角度为相关部门制定一系列政策文件以推动国有企业实施股权激励计划提供了参考依据。

Abstract

Improving the innovation level of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is an important micro foundation for implementing the strategy of innovation-driven development and promoting high quality economic development. This paper uses a sample of A-share state-controlled listed companies for the period 2006-2021, and empirically examined the impact of equity incentive plan on the innovation activities of SOEs by using the year-by-year propensity score matching method and multi-period difference-in-difference model. The findings demonstrated that the adoption of the equity incentive plan considerably raises SOEs' R&D expenditures, and that this effect is more notable in SOEs with low stock liquidity, high industry competitiveness, high degree of mixed ownership reform and in the mature stage. The mechanism test showed that the equity incentive plan mainly improves the R&D investment of SOEs by improving the quality of internal control and the level of risk-taking of executives, and overcoming the shortsighted tendency of executives. Further research revealed that the equity incentive plan mainly enhances the exploratory innovation investment rather than the exploitative innovation investment, and also improves the innovation efficiency and innovation output of SOEs, which reflects the innovation strategy of "raising quantity and quality together". This paper has enriched the research on the incentive mechanism of SOEs' innovation from the perspective of equity incentives, and will provide some theoretical references and empirical evidence for the relevant departments to formulate a series of policy documents to promote the implementation of equity incentive plans in SOEs from the perspective of enterprise innovation.

导出引用

李连伟, 纪骁鹏, 吕镯, 等. 股权激励计划对国有企业创新的影响研究[J]. 科研管理. 2024, 45(9): 175-183 https://doi.org/10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.09.018

Li Lianwei, Ji Xiaopeng, Lyu Zhuo, et al. Research on the impact of equity incentive plan on promoting innovation of state-owned enterprises[J]. Science Research Management. 2024, 45(9): 175-183 https://doi.org/10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.09.018

中图分类号： F276.1

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