科研管理

科研管理 ›› 2024, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (10): 45-55.DOI: 10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.10.005

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

灵活Vs审慎：国有股权监管改革与国企创新

李竹波1,2,李梅2,陈世来3   

  1. 1.武汉理工大学创业学院，湖北 武汉430070；
    2.武汉大学经济与管理学院，湖北 武汉430072；
    3.华中科技大学管理学院，湖北 武汉430074
  • 收稿日期:2022-12-02 修回日期:2024-07-12 出版日期:2024-10-20 发布日期:2024-10-11
  • 通讯作者: 陈世来
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目：“注册制下强化承销商监管对IPO定价效率的影响研究”（72302094，2024.01—2026.12）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金：“强化银行业监管的实体经济效应研究”（2024WKYXQN021，2024.07—2027.06）。

Flexibility Vs prudence: Reform and supervision of state-owned equity and innovation of state-owned enterprises

Li Zhubo1,2, Li Mei2, Chen Shilai3   

  1. 1. School of Entrepreneurship, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430070, Hubei, China;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China;
    3. School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430074, Hubei, China
  • Received:2022-12-02 Revised:2024-07-12 Online:2024-10-20 Published:2024-10-11

摘要：        深化国有企业改革，提高国有企业竞争力是当前经济体制改革的重要内容。本文使用中国2003—2011年和2014—2021年A股上市企业年度数据为样本，运用双重差分方法对比分析了国有股权审慎监管和灵活监管对企业创新影响的差异。研究发现，国有股权监管改革后，更灵活的监管对创新的激励效应更加明显。作用机制在于更灵活的监管通过优化股权结构、改善董事会治理、降低代理成本、提升财务冗余，从而发挥创新激励效应。异质性检验发现更灵活的监管对技术领先、非管制性行业的国企以及央企创新的影响更加显著。此外，更灵活的监管还显著促进了混合所有制改革，提升了国有企业的突破式创新数量和创新质量，最终提高了企业价值、盈利能力和资源配置效率。本文为国有股权监管放管服改革的制度红利提供了微观证据，也为深化国有企业改革、促进实体经济高质量发展提供了重要的政策启示。

关键词: 国有股权监管改革, 国有企业创新, 公司治理

Abstract:     Deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) and improving the competitiveness of SOEs is an important part of China's current economic system reform. We uses the double difference method to analyze the difference between the "prudential" and "flexible" supervision of state-owned equity on the innovation of SOEs. We found that after the reform of state-owned equity regulation, more "flexible" regulation has a more positive incentive effect on innovation. And it is more significant for central, technology leading and non "regulatory" industries SOEs. The mechanism test found that more "flexible" supervision has played an innovative incentive effect by improving the equity structure, improving board governance, reducing agency costs, and improving financial redundancy. In addition, the more "flexible" regulation has also significantly promoted the reform of mixed ownership, improved breakthrough innovation and innovation quality of SOEs, and ultimately improved enterprise value, profitability and resource allocation efficiency. We provide micro evidence for the institutional dividend of the reform direction of administration reform of state-owned equity supervision, and also provides important policy enlightenment for deepening the reform of SOEs and promoting the high-quality development of the real economy.

Key words: supervision and reform of state-owned equity, innovation of state-owned enterprises, corporate governance