国有企业创新攀比及其影响因素研究

卢闯; 牛煜皓; 李馨子

doi:10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.06.009

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科研管理 ›› 2024, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (6) : 83-94. DOI: 10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.06.009

国有企业创新攀比及其影响因素研究

卢闯 ¹ ,
牛煜皓 ² ,
李馨子 ¹

作者信息 +

A study of the innovation comparison in state-owned enterprises and its influencing factors

Author information +

文章历史 +

摘要

国有企业是我国科技创新的主力军。在加快培育新质生产力的时代背景下,探究如何提高创新质量、提升创新效率是推动国有企业做强做优做大的重要问题。本文以2010—2018年A股国有集团控股上市公司为样本,通过固定效应模型实证检验国有企业是否存在创新攀比以及创新攀比受到何种因素的影响。研究发现:公司间存在创新攀比现象,即当观察到同一集团内其他企业增加创新投入后,公司会在下一年度显著增加自身的创新投入;公司间的创新攀比降低了真实的创新效率。这一结论在一系列稳健性检验中保持稳健。当业绩考核压力更大、高管晋升的可能性更高时,创新攀比更严重,创新攀比对创新效率的负面影响更强。本文的研究结论不仅丰富了公司财务决策互相影响的相关文献,也为完善业绩考核制度、推动创新强国建设提供重要的政策启示。

Abstract

State-owned enterprises are the main force of scientific and technological innovation in China. In the era of accelerating cultivation of new quality productivity, exploring the means to improve the quality of innovation and enhance the efficiency of innovation is an important issue to promote the state-owned enterprises to become stronger, better and bigger. Based on the listed companies of the state control group from 2010 to 2018, this paper empirically tested whether innovation comparison exists in SOEs and what factors influence innovation comparison. We found through the study that there is a phenomenon of innovation comparison among SOEs, that is, when it is observed that other companies in the same group increase innovation investment, the company will significantly increase its innovation investment in the next year under the influence of performance evaluation. The innovation comparison among companies reduces the real innovation efficiency. This conclusion is still valid after several robustness tests. When the pressure of performance evaluation is greater or the possibility of manager promotion is higher, the innovation comparison is more serious, and the adverse influence of innovation comparison on innovation efficiency is stronger. The findings of this paper will not only enrich the literature on the mutual influence of corporate financial decisions, but also provide important policy insights for improving the performance evaluation system and promoting the construction of a strong innovative country.

导出引用

卢闯, 牛煜皓, 李馨子. 国有企业创新攀比及其影响因素研究[J]. 科研管理. 2024, 45(6): 83-94 https://doi.org/10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.06.009

Lu Chuang, Niu Yuhao, Li Xinzi. A study of the innovation comparison in state-owned enterprises and its influencing factors[J]. Science Research Management. 2024, 45(6): 83-94 https://doi.org/10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.06.009

中图分类号： F273.1;F276.6

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