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高管声誉对国有企业高质量创新的驱动机制研究
Research on the driving mechanism of executive reputation to the high-quality innovation of state-owned enterprises
为切实推进创新驱动高质量发展,需要深度探究如何突破技术创新的形式化与策略性局限,从高管激励视角构建国有企业高质量创新的驱动机制。本文从委托代理理论框架下的多个维度出发,运用A股国有上市公司数据,实证检验了高管声誉对国有企业高质量创新的影响及机制。结果表明:高管声誉能够有效促进国有企业高质量创新。作用机制检验表明,高管声誉通过提供激励补偿效应、提升委托代理效率、提高高管风险承担水平等路径,实现对高质量创新的驱动效应。异质性检验发现,高新技术行业特征与市场化程度等情境因素强化了高管声誉对国有企业高质量创新的正向影响。本文从高质量创新的视角验证了高管声誉的有效契约假说,拓展了委托代理理论的应用边界,为国有企业创新管理提供了理论层面的新视角与实践层面的新路径。
To effectively promote the innovation-driven high-quality development, it is necessary to explore how to overcome the formal and strategic limitations of technological innovation and construct a driving mechanism for high-quality innovation in state-owned enterprises from the perspective of executive incentives. Based on the framework of principal-agent theory, this study utilized the data from A-share state-owned listed companies to examine the influence and mechanism of executive reputation on high-quality innovation of state-owned enterprises from multiple dimensions. The results demonstrated that executive reputation promotes the high-quality innovation in state-owned enterprises effectively. The mechanism test showed that executive reputation drives the high-quality innovation by providing incentive compensation, enhancing principal-agent efficiency, and improving the level of executive risk-taking. The heterogeneity test revealed that contextual factors such as characteristics of high-tech industries and degree of marketization strengthen the positive effect of executive reputation on the high-quality innovation in state-owned enterprises. This paper has verified the effective contract hypothesis of executive reputation from the perspective of high-quality innovation, expanded the application boundaries of principal-agent theory, and will provide a new theoretical perspective and practical pathway for the innovation management of state-owned enterprises.
executive reputation / high-quality innovation / state-owned enterprise / driving mechanism
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