The technological innovation mode selection of Chinese new and high-techenterprises based on evolutionary game

Abstract

Abstract: In order to investigate the inner mechanism of technological innovation mode selection for new and high-tech enterprises, a game model of new and high-tech enterprises' technological innovation mode selection is constructed and the evolution dynamic stability of strategy selection is analyzed with the help of evolutionary economics. Through a numerical simulation, it shows the impact of different decision parameters and initial conditions on the results evolution. The conclusions reveal that the evolution system of technological innovation mode selection for new and high-tech enterprises converges to two types of patterns; one is ideal status, while the other is a poor "lock in" status. By adjusting the decision parameters, it makes enterprises be free from the poor "lock in" condition and lead them to evolve towards an expected direction.

Key words: new and high-tech enterprise, technological innovation mode, evolutionary game

CLC Number:

Dai Yuanyuan, Mei Qiang. The technological innovation mode selection of Chinese new and high-techenterprises based on evolutionary game[J]. Science Research Management, 2013, 34(1): 2-10.

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