减排视角下企业的最优研发与补贴

科研管理 ›› 2012, Vol. ›› Issue (10): 80-89.

减排视角下企业的最优研发与补贴

宋之杰, 孙其龙

燕山大学经济管理学院, 河北秦皇岛 066004

收稿日期:2011-12-22 修回日期:2012-05-15 出版日期:2012-10-27 发布日期:2012-10-22
基金资助:
国家软科学项目《装备制造业原始创新动力机制构建与建设路径研究》(2010GXS5D187:2010-2012)以及河北软科学项目《河北省高新技术产业发展R&D资源配置研究》(10447230D:2011-2012)资助。

The optimal R&D investment and subsidy under the perspective of emission reduction

Song Zhijie, Sun Qilong

Department of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, China

Received:2011-12-22 Revised:2012-05-15 Online:2012-10-27 Published:2012-10-22

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 以博弈论为理论基础,构建了研发补贴与污染排放税收下的企业研发模型,研究了减排目标下企业的最优研发水平、最优研发补贴和最优污染排放税收。研究结果显示:适当的污染排放税收有利于企业研发投入和产量的提高;研发补贴不会对企业的研发投入产生"排挤效应",可以较大程度上提高企业研发投入的积极性;企业对环境的污染需控制在社会可接受收的范围内,否则,企业的生产活动会被政府停止。

关键词: 减排, 溢出水平, 研发补贴, 博弈

Abstract: On the basis of game theory, an enterprise R&D model under conditions of R&D subsidy and pollution emission tax has been constructed. With the goal of emission reduction, optimal R&D level, optimal R&D subsidy, and optimal pollution emission tax for the enterprises are studied. The research results show that appropriate emission tax is of benefit to the improvement of the R&D investment and output of enterprises; the R&D subsidy is able to eliminate the effect of push aside and improve the R&D investment greatly. The environment pollution must be controlled in the scope of social acceptable; otherwise, the enterprise production activities will be ultimately stopped by the government.

Key words: emission reduction, spillover level, R&D subsidy, game

中图分类号:

F273.1

宋之杰, 孙其龙. 减排视角下企业的最优研发与补贴[J]. 科研管理, 2012, (10): 80-89.

Song Zhijie, Sun Qilong. The optimal R&D investment and subsidy under the perspective of emission reduction[J]. Science Research Management, 2012, (10): 80-89.

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