创新联合体，是新型举国体制的战略支点；企业牵头，是组建创新联合体的重要途径。如何构建“利益融合、要素融通、能力融汇”创新联合体，从而推动创新链和产业链深度耦合，是新形势下创新型国家建设过程中所面临的重大研究话题。本文通过案例分析法，解析企业牵头组建创新联合体五个管理环节和机制特征，据此构建三阶段动态演化模型。研究发现：（1）企业战略更新，是创新联合体的动力源泉；（2）二元组织架构，是两链耦合的关系支点；（3）实物期权思维，有利于激励兼容的利益融合；（4）交互学习机制，是要素融通的过程要津；（5）数字赋能手段，是能力融汇的重要支撑。本文构建创新联合体三阶段演化模型，解析创新链和产业链深度耦合的动态过程和管理思路，旨在为深陷红海竞争的传统企业提供稳进提质解决方案，从而全面安全推动科技自立自强和产业自主可控。

Innovation consortium is the strategic linchpin of the new national system, and the leadership of enterprises is an important way to form innovation consortium. How to build an innovation consortium with "fusion of interests, integration of elements and convergence of capabilities" to promote the deep coupling of innovation and industrial chains is an important research topic in the process of building an innovative country under the new situation. In this paper, we analyzed the characteristics of five management linkages and mechanisms of enterprise-led innovation consortia through case studies, and constructed a three-stage dynamic evolution model accordingly. It was found that: (1) corporate strategy renewal is the driving force of the innovation consortium; (2) binary organizational structure is the fulcrum of the relationship between the two chains; (3) real option thinking is conducive to incentive-compatible interest integration; (4) interactive learning mechanism is the key to the process of factor integration; (5) digital empowerment is the important support of capability integration. This paper constructs a three-stage evolutionary model of innovation consortium, analyzes the dynamic process and management ideas of deep coupling of innovation and industrial chains. Then aims to provide stable solutions for traditional enterprises in deep red sea competition, so as to comprehensively and safely promote S&T self-sufficiency and industrial autonomy.

尽快突破航空发动机产业的关键核心技术是保障国家战略安全的迫切需求，创新力量的有效组织成为关键核心技术攻关实践中亟待解决的瓶颈问题。本文梳理了我国航空发动机科研生产体系中的创新主体构成现状，剖析了实施协同创新面临的迫切问题；进一步阐明了航空发动机关键核心技术攻关过程中各主体的角色定位，涵盖政府、军队、中国航发、专业化维修企业、上 / 下游企业、高校和科研院所等。研究认为，统筹安排并科学布局关键核心技术攻关工作、设计相应制度与机制以引导激励各类主体主动对接国家战略、重视需求侧对技术发展的牵引作用、由领军企业主导构建一批面向用户需求与产品问题的创新联合体、以重大项目为载体构建创新生态系统，由此高效组织各类主体协同攻关航空发动机关键核心技术。

Achieving breakthroughs of key core technologies in the aero-engine industry is urgently required for guaranteeing national strategic security, and it demands effective organization of innovation forces. This study first analyses the major innovation forces and their problems regarding collaborative innovation in the current aero-engine scientific research and production system in China. Subsequently, it clarifies the roles of relevant forces in the research process of key core technologies, including the government, the army, the Aero Engine Corporation of China, professional maintenance enterprises, upstream and downstream enterprises, universities, and research institutes. Furthermore, we suggest that the breakthrough practice should be planned and organized in an overall manner, corresponding institutions and mechanisms should be created to encourage the innovation forces to closely align with national strategies, the driving role of the demand side should be emphasized, a number of innovation consortia aiming at user needs and product problems should be established by leading enterprises, and an innovation ecosystem should be established relying on major projects.

创新联合体是我国落实创新驱动发展战略的重要举措，其利益主体的多元化及其利益诉求的复杂性导致各方在创新协作中不可避免地存在着利益冲突，增加了利益整合与平衡的难度，影响了创新联合体的发展。为此，本文应用冲突理论、博弈论等对创新联合体利益冲突的本质和机理进行分析，归纳提出了规则性利益冲突、关系性利益冲突、分配性利益冲突三类冲突，并根据多边讨价还价博弈理论、正态分布函数、Shapley值法等构建了创新联合体利益分配过程的数学模型，对该过程不同环节产生的各类利益冲突进行量化评估，进而选取典型案例从实践层面对上述理论模型进行实证检验，最后提出了有效均衡创新联合体各方利益关系的策略建议，主要包括建立有利于共同治理的有效治理结构、促进以增强互信为核心的创新文化建设以及强化基于动态管理的激励约束措施。

Innovation Consortium is an important factor to build the national innovation system. However, the diversity of stakeholders and the complexity of their interest demands lead to inevitable conflicts of interest in innovation collaboration, thus increasing the difficulty of interest integration and equilibrium, and affects the development of the Innovation Consortium. Therefore, this paper applies conflict theory and game theory to analyze the essence and mechanism of the conflict of interest in the Innovation Consortium, summarizes and brings up three types of conflicts: rule-based interest conflicts, relational interest conflicts, and distributive interest conflicts. Then, using theoretical methods such as multilateral bargaining game theory, normal distribution function, Shapley value method to construct a mathematical model of the interest distribution process of the Innovation Consortium, quantitatively evaluates various conflicts of interest in different parts of the process, and opting for a typical case to testify to the theoretical analysis. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions on how to balance the interests of all parties in the Innovation Consortium, including establishing an effective governance structure conducive to joint governance, promoting the construction of the culture of innovation, which has a core of enhancing mutual trust, as well as strengthening incentive and constraint measures based on dynamic management.

药品安全关乎人民群众生命健康、经济发展、社会稳定和国家安全，一直以来都是政府和全社会关注的热点问题之一。但是，近年来频发的各类药品安全事件，揭露了政府监管缺失、药品检测机制不完善、公众投诉失效等诸多问题。本文考虑了药品检测中存在寻租现象，构建了药品生产企业、第三方药品检测机构和政府监管部门之间的三方演化博弈模型，分析了各参与方策略选择的演化稳定性，探讨了各要素对三方策略选择的影响关系，进一步分析了三方博弈系统中均衡点的稳定性。研究结果表明：1)政府增强奖励、惩罚力度均有助于促进企业生产高药效药品、第三方药品检测机构拒绝寻租的规范行为，但是增大奖励力度将不利于政府自身履行监管职责；2)政府设定合理的奖惩机制必须符合对各方的奖惩之和大于其投机收益的条件，才能保障演化稳定市场环境下的药品安全；3)上级政府对监管部门失职的问责对增强企业生产高药效药品的稳健性具有重要意义；4)提升企业的药品销售收益、增加企业寻租成本也是避免企业生产低药效药品的有效途径。最后，利用Matlab 2020b进行了仿真分析，为政府完善药品监管机制提出了对策与建议。

Drug safety concerns the people’s life and health, economic development, social stability and national security. It has always been one of the hot issues that the government and the whole society are focusing on. However, in recent years, various drug safety incidents have been frequently reported, which have revealed many problems such as the lacking of government supervision, imperfect drug testing mechanisms. In recent years, the rapid development of third-party drug testing institutions has not only supplemented government supervision, but also provided technical support for pharmaceutical manufacturers. However, driven by interests, there are phenomena of rent-seeking in drug testing between pharmaceutical manufacturing enterprises and the third-party testing agencies. In order to study how to improve the drug quality supervision mechanism to ensure the quality of drugs and avoid rent-seeking in the process of drug testing, a three-party evolutionary game model among drug manufacturers, third-party drug testing institutions and government regulatory agencies has been constructed. Based on the three-party evolutionary game theory, the evolutionary stability of each participant's strategy choices has been analyzed, the influence of each factor on the choice of three-party strategy has been discussed, and the stability of the equilibrium points in the three-party game system has been further analyzed using Jacobian matrix and Lyapunov’s indirect method. The main results show that: 1) increased incentives and penalties by the government will help enterprises to produce high-efficiency drugs and third-party drug testing institutions to refuse to seek rent, but, increased incentives will not be conducive to the government's own performance of regulatory responsibilities; 2) in order to guarantee the safety of drugs in an evolutionarily stable market environment, the government should set reasonable reward and punishment mechanisms in line with the conditions that the sum of the rewards and punishments of each party is greater than its speculative income, that is the condition that the system has only one evolutionary stable equilibrium point; 3) the accountability of the superior government for the dereliction of duty of the regulatory authorities is of great significance to enhance the stability of enterprises in producing high-efficiency drugs; 4) enhancing the company’s drug sales revenue and increasing the company’s rent-seeking cost are also effective ways to avoid enterprises producing low-efficiency drugs. In addition, the parameters are assigned to numerical values based on the conditions of the evolutionary stability strategies which obtained by the model analysis and combined with the reality. The influence of each element on the evolution of each party’s strategy and the stability of the game system under different conditions has been simulated using the Matlab 2020b software. The simulation analysis verifies the correctness of the model analysis and the effectiveness of the countermeasures and suggestions for improving the government supervision mechanism. In short, this paper puts forward a variety of measures to ensure the stable production of high-effective drugs in enterprises and to eliminate rent-seeking, which is conducive to improving the government’s regulatory strategy to ensure patients’ medication safety.