灵活Vs审慎：国有股权监管改革与国企创新

李竹波; 李梅; 陈世来

doi:10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.10.005

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科研管理 ›› 2024, Vol. 45 ›› Issue (10) : 45-55. DOI: 10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.10.005

论文

灵活Vs审慎：国有股权监管改革与国企创新

李竹波^1,2,李梅²,陈世来³

作者信息 +

Flexibility Vs prudence: Reform and supervision of state-owned equity and innovation of state-owned enterprises

Li Zhubo^1,2, Li Mei², Chen Shilai³

Author information +

文章历史 +

摘要

深化国有企业改革，提高国有企业竞争力是当前经济体制改革的重要内容。本文使用中国2003—2011年和2014—2021年A股上市企业年度数据为样本，运用双重差分方法对比分析了国有股权审慎监管和灵活监管对企业创新影响的差异。研究发现，国有股权监管改革后，更灵活的监管对创新的激励效应更加明显。作用机制在于更灵活的监管通过优化股权结构、改善董事会治理、降低代理成本、提升财务冗余，从而发挥创新激励效应。异质性检验发现更灵活的监管对技术领先、非管制性行业的国企以及央企创新的影响更加显著。此外，更灵活的监管还显著促进了混合所有制改革，提升了国有企业的突破式创新数量和创新质量，最终提高了企业价值、盈利能力和资源配置效率。本文为国有股权监管放管服改革的制度红利提供了微观证据，也为深化国有企业改革、促进实体经济高质量发展提供了重要的政策启示。

Abstract

Deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) and improving the competitiveness of SOEs is an important part of China's current economic system reform. We uses the double difference method to analyze the difference between the "prudential" and "flexible" supervision of state-owned equity on the innovation of SOEs. We found that after the reform of state-owned equity regulation, more "flexible" regulation has a more positive incentive effect on innovation. And it is more significant for central, technology leading and non "regulatory" industries SOEs. The mechanism test found that more "flexible" supervision has played an innovative incentive effect by improving the equity structure, improving board governance, reducing agency costs, and improving financial redundancy. In addition, the more "flexible" regulation has also significantly promoted the reform of mixed ownership, improved breakthrough innovation and innovation quality of SOEs, and ultimately improved enterprise value, profitability and resource allocation efficiency. We provide micro evidence for the institutional dividend of the reform direction of administration reform of state-owned equity supervision, and also provides important policy enlightenment for deepening the reform of SOEs and promoting the high-quality development of the real economy.

导出引用

李竹波李梅陈世来. 灵活Vs审慎：国有股权监管改革与国企创新[J]. 科研管理. 2024, 45(10): 45-55 https://doi.org/10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.10.005

Flexibility Vs prudence: Reform and supervision of state-owned equity and innovation of state-owned enterprises[J]. Science Research Management. 2024, 45(10): 45-55 https://doi.org/10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.10.005

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