PDF(1130 KB)
PDF(1130 KB)
PDF(1130 KB)
营商环境、研发补贴与国有企业实质性创新
Business environment, R&D subsidies, and substantive innovation in state-owned enterprises
在中国政府研发补贴持续加大的同时,企业创新产出数量可观但是质量低下,如何更好地实现实质性创新?本文选取沪深A股上市的“战略性新兴产业”中93家国有企业作为观测对象,通过固定效应模型进行实证检验。发现:(1)尽管研发补贴对于企业创新产出具有正向的促进作用。但企业为了获得研发补贴,更倾向于选择研发周期较短的策略性创新。因此,单纯增加补贴规模并不能提高实质性创新的产出。(2)与事前研发补贴相比,事后研发补贴的方式更有利于促进创新。(3)营商环境通过风险预期和盈利预期促进企业实质性创新。在创新收益风险低的高端装备制造企业中、竞争性较高的行业中和较完善的法制环境中,研发补贴能够促进企业实质性创新;而在由因官员变更带来创新预期收益不稳定的政务环境中,研发补贴不能促进企业实质性创新。这些结果揭示了营商环境是研发补贴助推企业实质性创新的条件及其作用机理,理清了研发补贴和营商环境两种政府行为对企业创新产出的不同影响结果,对研发补贴如何更有效地解决“卡脖子”难题具有启示意义。
Although the Chinese government's R&D subsidies continue to increase, enterprises' innovation output is considerable in quantity and low in quality. How to better achieve substantive innovation and solve the problem of "stranglehold"? Ninety-three state-owned enterprises in strategic emerging industries listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2010 to 2017 were selected as the observation objects, and the fixed effect model was used for an empirical test. It was found from this study that: (1) R&D subsidies can promote enterprise innovation, but enterprises are more inclined to choose strategic innovation rather than substantive innovation. The increase in the scale of subsidies cannot solve the problem of "stranglehold". (2) Ex post R&D subsidies are more conducive to promoting innovation than ex post R&D subsidies. (3) The business environment promotes substantive innovation through risk expectation and profit expectation. In high-end equipment manufacturing industry with low risk of innovation return, competitive industry with high premium of innovative products and legal environment with stable expectation of innovation return, R&D subsidies can promote substantive innovation of enterprises. And in a government environment where the expected benefits of innovation are unstable due to official changes, R&D subsidies do not promote substantive innovation. It revealed further that the business environment is the condition and mechanism for R&D subsidies to promote the substantive innovation of enterprises. It clarified the impact of two kinds of government actions, namely granting R&D subsidies and optimizing business environment, on enterprises' innovation output. This research has policy implications for R&D subsidies to more effectively solve the problem of "stranglehold".
| [1] |
|
| [2] |
|
| [3] |
黎文靖, 郑曼妮. 实质性创新还是策略性创新?宏观产业政策对微观企业创新的影响[J]. 经济研究, 2016, 51(4):60-73.
|
| [4] |
袁胜军, 俞立平, 钟昌标, 等. 创新政策促进了创新数量还是创新质量?:以高技术产业为例[J]. 中国软科学, 2020(3):32-45.
|
| [5] |
安同良, 周绍东, 皮建才. R&D补贴对中国企业自主创新的激励效应[J]. 经济研究, 2009, 44(10):87-98,120.
|
| [6] |
|
| [7] |
魏下海, 董志强, 张永璟. 营商制度环境为何如此重要?:来自民营企业家“内治外攘”的经验证据[J]. 经济科学, 2015(2):105-116.
|
| [8] |
汪琼, 李栋栋, 王克敏. 营商“硬环境”与公司现金持有:基于市场竞争和投资机会的研究[J]. 会计研究, 2020(4):88-99.
|
| [9] |
夏后学, 谭清美, 白俊红. 营商环境、企业寻租与市场创新:来自中国企业营商环境调查的经验证据[J]. 经济研究, 2019, 54(4):84-98.
|
| [10] |
马骆茹, 朱博恩. 需求波动、营商环境与企业的研发行为:以长三角和珠三角为例[J]. 北京工业大学学报(社会科学版), 2017, 17(2):47-57.
|
| [11] |
王永进, 冯笑. 行政审批制度改革与企业创新[J]. 中国工业经济, 2018(2):24-42.
|
| [12] |
姜钧乐. 政府研发补贴与国有企业创新产出[D]. 苏州: 苏州大学, 2020.
|
| [13] |
沈珍珠. 代理成本与企业技术创新产出[D]. 杭州: 杭州电子科技大学, 2021.
|
| [14] |
王砾, 孔东民, 代昀昊. 官员晋升压力与企业创新[J]. 管理科学学报, 2018, 21(1):111-126.
|
| [15] |
杨洋, 魏江, 罗来军. 谁在利用政府补贴进行创新?:所有制和要素市场扭曲的联合调节效应[J]. 管理世界, 2015(1):75-86+98+188.
|
| [16] |
王刚刚, 谢富纪, 贾友. R&D补贴政策激励机制的重新审视:基于外部融资激励机制的考察[J]. 中国工业经济, 2017(2):60-78.
|
| [17] |
龙小宁, 王俊. 中国专利激增的动因及其质量效应[J]. 世界经济, 2015, 38(6):115-142.
|
| [18] |
夏后学, 谭清美. 简政放权与政府补贴如何影响技术创新[J]. 财贸经济, 2017, 38(5):129-146.
|
| [19] |
史宇鹏, 顾全林. 知识产权保护、异质性企业与创新:来自中国制造业的证据[J]. 金融研究, 2013(8):136-149.
|
| [20] |
许志端, 阮舟一龙. 营商环境、技术创新和企业绩效:基于我国省级层面的经验证据[J]. 厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2019(05):123-134.
|
| [21] |
张菀洺, 杨广钊. 营商环境对民营企业竞争力的影响[J]. 财贸经济, 2022, 43(10):119-133.
|
| [22] |
杨海生, 陈少凌, 罗党论, 等. 政策不稳定性与经济增长:来自中国地方官员变更的经验证据[J]. 管理世界, 2014(9):13-28.
|
| [23] |
申宇, 傅立立, 赵静梅. 市委书记更替对企业寻租影响的实证研究[J]. 中国工业经济, 2015(9):37-52.
|
| [24] |
|
| [25] |
吴超鹏, 唐菂. 知识产权保护执法力度、技术创新与企业绩效:来自中国上市公司的证据[J]. 经济研究, 2016, 51(11):125-139.
|
| [26] |
王小鲁, 樊纲, 余文静. 中国分省份市场化指数报告(2016)[M]. 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2017.
|
/
| 〈 |
|
〉 |