“卡脖子”技术突破中跟随企业与领先企业的演化博弈研究

doi:10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2025.01.013

科研管理 ›› 2025, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (1): 123-133.DOI: 10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2025.01.013

“卡脖子”技术突破中跟随企业与领先企业的演化博弈研究

伍勇¹,魏泽龙²,孙佩瑜¹

1.西北大学公共管理学院，陕西西安710127；
2.西安交通大学管理学院，陕西西安710049

收稿日期:2023-12-27 修回日期:2024-11-25 出版日期:2025-01-20 发布日期:2025-01-09
通讯作者: 魏泽龙
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重大项目：“科技自立自强作为国家经济发展的战略支持研究”（22ZDA048，2022—2025）。

Research on the evolutionary game between follower and leading firms in the breakthrough of "bottleneck" technologies

Wu Yong¹, Wei Zelong², Sun Peiyu¹

1. School of Public Management, Northwest University, Xi′an 710127, Shaanxi, China;
2. School of Management, Xi′an Jiaotong University, Xi′an 710049, Shaanxi, China

Received:2023-12-27 Revised:2024-11-25 Online:2025-01-20 Published:2025-01-09

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 由于国外领先企业的竞争性反应，一些成功实现“卡脖子”技术突破的中国企业陷入“创新获益陷阱”难以自拔，跟随企业如何从关键技术突破中获益成为亟须解决的问题。基于跟随企业不同的技术突破策略和领先企业关于技术突破的不同反应，本文构建了关键技术突破中跟随企业和领先企业竞争性互动的演化博弈模型，分析了不同因素影响下跟随企业与领先企业在关键技术突破中策略选择的演化路径。研究结果表明：双方最终的策略选择与政府对跟随企业关键技术突破的补贴无关；双方对各种策略选择的初始概率对策略演化路径有一定的影响；领先企业采取降价措施对跟随企业的打击力度和对自己的伤害程度、跟随企业采取不同突破策略的研发成本差异等是影响双方稳定策略均衡的关键因素。本研究丰富了创新获益理论和动态竞争理论的研究视角，为中国企业避开关键技术突破中的“创新获益陷阱”提供新的参考思路。
关键词

关键词: “卡脖子”技术, 创新获益, 演化博弈, 动态竞争

Abstract: Due to the competitive responses of leading firms, many firms that have successfully achieved "bottleneck" technological breakthroughs have been trapped on the way to profit from innovation. How to profit from breakthroughs of core technologies has become an urgent problem that needs to be solved for follower firms. Based on different technological breakthrough strategies of the follower firms and various response strategies of the leading firms regarding follower firms′ innovation breakthrough, this paper constructed an evolutionary game model for the competitive interaction between the follower and leading firms in core technological breakthroughs. This paper analyzed the evolutionary paths of the strategic choices of the follower and leading firms under different circumstances. The results indicated that: first, the final strategic choices of both parties are not affected by government subsidies for follower firms. Second, the initial probabilities of various strategy choices by both parties affect the stable equilibrium strategies. Third, the key factors affecting the stable equilibrium strategies are the impact of price reduction measures taken by leading firms on follower firms and the loss to leading firms, as well as the differences in R&D costs of different breakthrough strategies adopted by follower firms. The research has extended the Profit-From-Innovation theory and the competitive dynamics theory. Besides, this research will have a positive effect on guiding Chinese firms to avoid the profit trap in innovation breakthroughs.

Key words: "bottleneck" technology, profit from innovation, evolutionary game, dynamic competition

伍勇, 魏泽龙, 孙佩瑜. “卡脖子”技术突破中跟随企业与领先企业的演化博弈研究[J]. 科研管理, 2025, 46(1): 123-133.

Wu Yong, Wei Zelong, Sun Peiyu. Research on the evolutionary game between follower and leading firms in the breakthrough of "bottleneck" technologies[J]. Science Research Management, 2025, 46(1): 123-133.

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“卡脖子”技术突破中跟随企业与领先企业的演化博弈研究

Research on the evolutionary game between follower and leading firms in the breakthrough of "bottleneck" technologies

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