科研管理 ›› 2025, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (7): 123-131.DOI: 10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2025.07.012

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

政府补贴影响创新生态系统主体间技术博弈研究

周钟,付胜君,班燚   

  1. 上海应用技术大学经济与管理学院,上海200237
  • 收稿日期:2023-11-15 修回日期:2024-12-23 出版日期:2025-07-20 发布日期:2025-07-14
  • 通讯作者: 周钟
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目:“面向技术更替的积分限额交易型产业政策作用机理与政策优化研究”(19CGL056,2019—2024);上海市软科学重点项目:“面向三大先导产业科技前沿的创新联合体合作模式、协同机制与激励政策研究”(21692191800,2021—2024);上海市东方英才计划青年项目(4521ZK04,2024—2026)。

Research on the influence of government subsidies on the technical game between agents in the innovation ecosystem

Zhou Zhong, Fu Shengjun, Ban Yi   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Institute of Technology, Shanghai 200237, China
  • Received:2023-11-15 Revised:2024-12-23 Online:2025-07-20 Published:2025-07-14

摘要:     采取选择性补贴方式扶持特定企业和支持产业发展是政府的通常做法,其对创新生态系统内不同主体技术策略的影响与机制是值得研究的重要问题。本文以创新生态系统中的领先企业和跟随企业作为研究对象,构建演化博弈模型,分析双方的博弈关系和稳定策略,并进一步应用Netlogo软件仿真,研究不同强度下的政府选择性补助和税收优惠对两类主体技术策略博弈的影响。研究发现:第一,领先企业和跟随企业的技术策略博弈存在三种演化稳定策略,适度提高政府补贴强度和专利保护力度可以促使领先企业采取专利保护措施,并刺激跟随企业开展创新。第二,选择性补贴强度对企业技术策略选择呈非线性影响,灵活地调整补贴强度对企业采取最优技术策略和营造稳定的市场环境均有正向作用。第三,相比于政府补助,税收优惠更能促使企业选择最优技术策略,多元化和精细化的补贴政策能更精确地引导企业发展方向。研究结论拓展并深化了创新生态系统视角下政府补贴影响创新主体间技术博弈的理论研究,为政府部门灵活调整和精准优化补贴政策,从而加快引导产业发展提供重要启示。

关键词: 选择性补贴, 创新生态系统, 技术博弈, 多主体仿真

Abstract:      It is a common practice for the government to support specific enterprises and promote industrial development by means of selective subsidies. The impact and mechanism of this move on the technological strategies of different entities within the innovation ecosystem are important issues worthy of research. This paper adopted the leading enterprises and the following enterprises in the innovation ecosystem as the research objects, constructed an evolutionary game model to analyze the game relationship and stable strategies of both sides, and further applied the Netlogo software for simulation to study the impact of the government′s selective subsidies and tax preferences under different intensities on the technological strategy game of the two types of entities. The research findings are as follows: Firstly, there are three evolutionary stable strategies in the technological strategy game between the leading enterprises and the following enterprises. Moderately increasing the intensity of government subsidies and patent protection can prompt the leading enterprises to adopt patent protection measures and stimulate the following enterprises to carry out innovation. Secondly, the intensity of selective subsidies has a nonlinear impact on the choice of enterprise technological strategies. Flexibly adjusting the subsidy intensity has a positive effect on enterprises′ adoption of optimal technological strategies and the creation of a stable market environment. Thirdly, compared with government subsidies, tax preferences can better prompt enterprises to choose optimal technological strategies. Diversified and refined subsidy policies can guide the development direction of enterprises more accurately. The research conclusions will expand and deepen the theoretical research on the impact of government subsidies on the technological game among innovation entities from the perspective of innovation ecosystem, and provide important implications for government departments to flexibly adjust and precisely optimize subsidy policies so as to accelerate the guidance of industrial development.

Key words: selective subsidy, innovation ecosystem, technical game, multi-agent simulation