The political connections and R&D of private enterprises basedon the perspective of marketization degree

Jiang Yawen; Huang Yan; Xu Wen

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Science Research Management ›› 2012 ›› Issue (10) : 48-55.

The political connections and R&D of private enterprises basedon the perspective of marketization degree

Jiang Yawen, Huang Yan, Xu Wen

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Abstract

The relationships between private enterprise’s political connections and their investments on R&D among different regions of China with diverse marketization degree are focused on. Using the investment climate survey conducted by World Bank in China and controlling a series of relative factors, the following findings are obtained: (1) the political connected private enterprises are more likely to conduct R&D activities than non-political connected companies; (2) the lower the marketization degree and the more backward economic development a region is, the more noticeable the effect mentioned above is.

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marketization degree / private enterprise / political connection / R&D participation

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Jiang Yawen, Huang Yan, Xu Wen. The political connections and R&D of private enterprises basedon the perspective of marketization degree[J]. Science Research Management. 2012(10): 48-55

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