Considering project engineering’s complexity and non-cooperative characters, a dual objects strategic response model that audit efficiency influence factors are combined with each other under the non-cooperative dynamic game analysis frame is built, and the strategic behaviors during project engineering audit are studied by using the reciprocity theory of information aggregation. The conclusions are as follows: Auditor better has the control on the scale of key information about project, optimizes the relation pattern between auditor and project deputy in order to reduce those repeated and non-key information works, the essential object of strategic response by project deputy is the motivation level of information seeking by auditor, and the information seeking motivation of auditor should be strategically controlled or hidden.
Key words
project engineering audit /
reciprocity of information aggregation /
strategy reaction /
key audit information
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