Abstract:     As an objective phenomenon in process of innovation, innovation failure may affect the subsequent innovation decision-making behavior. However, there are few relevant empirical studies, especially research on the re-innovation performance after enterprise innovation failure. Whether innovation failure will reduce the re-innovation performance of enterprises, and whether executive compensation incentive can be the "good medicine" to alleviate this impact need further research and exploration. This paper uses the data of China′s A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 to explore the impact of innovation failure on enterprises re-innovation performance and the moderating effect of executive compensation incentive from the perspectives of principal-agent problems, managerial myopia and prospect theory. The results of the study show that innovation failure has a significant negative impact on the enterprise′s re-innovation performance. Compared with short-term executive compensation incentive, long-term executive compensation incentive can significantly weaken the relationship between innovation failure and re-innovation performance of enterprises. Heterogeneity analysis show that compared with strategic innovation, innovation failure has a greater negative impact on substantial innovation in the next period, which indicates that the "quality" of innovation deteriorates seriously after innovation failure, but at the same time, long-term executive compensation incentive can weaken the negative impact of innovation failure on substantial innovation. Compared with non-state-owned enterprises, innovation failure has a greater negative impact on the re-innovation performance of state-owned enterprises and the positive moderating effect of long-term executive compensation incentive is more significant in state-owned enterprises.The research results enrich the relevant literature on the influencing factors of enterprise technological innovation, provide a theoretical reference for enterprises to establish an effective innovation incentive mechanism, and it also has theoretical guidance and practical significance for improving enterprise innovation performance.
    This study also provides some important policy implications. First of all, the empirical results show that innovation failure has a negative impact on the company′s re-innovation performance. Innovation failure as an inevitable event in the company′s innovation process will cause innovation trauma and the risk aversion decisions and short-sighted behaviors made by managers will significantly reduce the company′s re-innovation performance. It is important for enterprise innovation management to overcome the trauma of innovation failure, but it has not received sufficient attention. Therefore, if enterprises can adjust the negative impact of innovation failure in practice, they can effectively improve the sustainability and success rate of innovation. Secondly, we find that long-term executive compensation incentive can inhibit the negative impact of innovation failure on re-innovation performance, while short-term executive compensation incentive can aggravate the impact. It is suggested that granting managers certain ownership and profit-sharing rights can alleviate the decline of managers′ willingness to innovate after innovation failure, which is helpful for managers to pay attention to the long-term development of the company, and weaken the motivation to engage in self-interested behavior. Therefore, in practice, the implementation of a executive compensation mechanism that unifies the wealth of managers and shareholders can alleviate the principal-agent problem to some extent, supervise and motivate the manager to commit to the long-term development of enterprises effectively.
    The contribution of this study is as follows: firstly, in practice, enterprises can reduce the loss and pressure that managers may face after innovation failure by designing a reasonable long-term executive compensation incentive mechanism, that is, reduce the negative impact of innovation failure on their re-innovation enthusiasm, and guide managers to become better enterprise innovation leaders; secondly, based on the existing incentive innovation model, this paper introduces executives′ expectation of success probability of innovation, which improves the rationality and scientificity of executives′ innovation decision-making; last but not least, this paper finds that the negative impact of innovation failure on enterprise re-innovation performance and the moderating effect of long-term executive compensation incentive are more significant in state-owned enterprises, this finding provides another explanation for the lower innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises compared with non-state-owned enterprises, and also provides a new idea for how to improve the innovation efficiency of state-owned enterprises.

Key words: innovation failure, re-innovation performance, executive compensation incentive, moderating role, heterogeneity analysis