Patent commercialization plays an important role in realizing patents′ economic benefits and social value. However, in the existing research, there is little attention on tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization. Strengthening tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization is of great significance for digging out the potential value of patents and accelerating the transformation from quantity to quality for patents in China. 
    Assuming all participants are bounded rational, this paper selects some important variables about inventors′ activeness, enterprises′ accepting capability, reputation effect, and two-stage payment contract. By these variables, it designs a dynamic evolving game model involving three key subjects: inventors, enterprises, and intermediaries. In addition, it analyzes and explores the impacts of these factors on tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization by replication dynamic equations and simulations implemented by MATLAB software. In conclusions, the paper indicates that it improves tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization if inventors′ activeness is well matched with enterprises′ accepting capability, especially high activeness of inventors is matched with high accepting capability of enterprises. Besides a good evaluation system of reputation is also one of efficient measures to improve tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization. And a different payment percentage in a two-stage contract also plays a significant role in the tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization. Accordingly, the following countermeasures are proposed:
    First, the construction of patent trading platform should be strengthened. The database in patent trading platform should be improved to save all key information of participants, keep track of all trading transaction data, etc. Besides, the matchmaking mechanism of inventors and enterprises should be continuously optimized in order to find out suitable inventors and enterprises more efficiently and more accurately.
    Second, the reputation evaluation system of the platform should be improved. On the one hand, a set of comprehensive reputation indicators should be introduced to evaluate trading behaviors of participants in patent commercialization, and the rules of reward and punishment can be set up to restrict behaviors of participants. On the other hand, an intelligent reputation monitoring system should be established. Under the premise of proper privacy protection, the reputation scores of participants should be made public.
    Third, the design of two-stage contract should be optimized. The total payment of the two-stage contract should be seriously considered to ensure that both inventors and enterprises can obtain reasonable economic rewards. If the total payment of a two-stage contract is too high, it is easy to lead to the risk that an enterprise does not comply with the contract. And if the total payment of a two-stage contract is too low, it is easy to lead to the risk that an inventor does not follow the contract. 
    This paper explored the dynamic evolution process of tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization based on evolutionary game theory, which provides new perspectives and ideas for researches on patent commercialization, but there are still some areas for improvement and perfection. Tacit knowledge sharing in patent commercialization is a complex process, but only key influence factors are examined in this paper. Besides, government policies also affect participants′ behaviors in patent commercialization and simulation parameters are taken from limited sources at present.