Abstract:    With the development of globalization of knowledge economy, intellectual property has become a powerful weapon of the competition for industrial interests and the competition between countries. The formulation of global intellectual property standards has become a focal issue in the game between countries which has attracted great attention of scholars. It has not only become an important subject for legal scholars to study, but has also been brought into the vision of international relations scholars and it has begun to become a new research field of international relations.
    Foreign scholars started their research in this field earlier and achieved richer achievements. Influenced by foreign research, in recent years, some domestic scholars have also begun to explore the formation of global intellectual property standards from the perspective of international relations or international politics. However, compared with foreign scholars, in China, the research in this field is seriously lagging behind, the relevant achievements are very limited, and the original achievements are even scarce. This situation is extremely incompatible with China′s status as a leading power in intellectual property and China′s goal of building a powerful intellectual property country.
    In pace with the rapid development of economy and the deepening of participation in globalization, China is approaching the center of the world stage as never before. Active participation in global intellectual property governance has become an a proposition of the times facing China. However, compared with the strong demand to actively participate in global governance of intellectual property, China′s ability to participate in the formulation of international intellectual property rules is still insufficient. The main reason for this lies in the lack of in-depth research on theories and policies of related issues, which leads to the inability to have our voice. The new rules of international intellectual property protection are the results of the game of international political and economic forces. Chinese scholars urgently need to strengthen the research on international politics and international relations of intellectual property, and to improve their discourse power in the construction of the international intellectual property order and their ability of intellectual property global governance.
    In theory of international relations, "two-level game" is a theory to study the interaction between international politics and domestic politics. This theory has a strong explanatory power for international negotiations, and many scholars use it to conduct case studies on international issues. However, there is an obvious deficiency in this theory, that is, it ignores the existence of the alliance of states in international negotiations and lacks explanatory power for the international negotiations with alliance of states. In the process of the formation of global intellectual property standards, it is common for countries to establish alliances and the game between countries is also carried out on three levels, namely, the domestic level, the international (transnational) level and the alliance level. The global standards of intellectual property rights are formed by the intellectual property-related actors through these three levels of games. However, no relevant literature has been found to study the formation of global standards for intellectual property from the perspective of the three-level game.
    This paper briefly introduces the core content of the two-level game theory, and points out the shortcomings of the two-level game theory. On this basis, this paper constructs a three-level game model formed by global intellectual property standards and incorporates games between nine types and three levels into the model for empirical analysis, namely, the game within the interest groups of intellectual property owners in international negotiations; the game between interest groups of intellectual property owners and users; the game between interest groups and local government; the game between the United States and developing countries; the game between the United States and other developed countries; the game among developing countries; the transnational game between interest groups of different countries; the game between interest groups and foreign governments; the game between national alliances. Then, this paper has come up with some beneficial revelations, that is, multilateralism should be upheld in international negotiations on intellectual property rights; international rules on intellectual property rights should balance interests; developing countries should be adept at discovering and utilizing the power of "silent ally" in international negotiations on intellectual property rights.

Key words: intellectual property rights, global standards, two-level games, three-level games