Innovation is the primary driving force for development and the strategic underpinning for building a modernized economy. In order to encourage innovation and development of enterprises, the Chinese government issued the Measures for Administration of High-Tech Enterprise Recognition in April 2008, which granted the approved enterprises the qualification of high-tech enterprises, with which the enterprises could enjoy 10% income tax reduction. The evaluation of the recognition results of high-tech enterprises has important reference value for further implementation and improvement of policies, and has important practical significance for promoting the innovation and development of high-tech enterprises. Therefore, based on the research sample of A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017, this paper uses the main component analysis method to construct the measurement index of the recognition results of high-tech enterprises, uses propensity score matching method to balance the systematic differences between the experimental group and the control group, and evaluates the implementation effect of the current policy by using the DID model.The study found that the current policy can improve the technological innovation ability of enterprises on the whole, but it has no significant influence on the ability to commercialize technological achievements. The results of dynamic marginal effect analysis show that the promotion effect of high-tech enterprise qualification on the technological innovation ability of enterprises increases first and then decreases, but there is no regular effect on the ability to commercialize technological achievements. The result of heterogeneity analysis shows that the current policy has better incentive effect on large scale, abundant cash flow, strong operation ability and growing enterprises.The policy implications of this paper include the following points. First of all, policy makers should follow the inherent rules of innovation activities, establish a long-term assessment mechanism, and moderately relax the assessment period for some industries with high innovation risk or long R&D cycle, so as to avoid strategic innovation in order to meet the policy requirements. In addition, the evaluation factor of "time to acquire intellectual property" should be added to the policy, so as to raise the requirement for new intellectual property of enterprises, and promote the continuous innovation input and output of enterprises. Also, policymakers should guide enterprises to pay attention to the commercial value of innovation results, add requirements on the financial performance of the commercialization of innovation results, and prevent the occurrence of speculation. What′s more, policymakers should enrich existing support policies for high-tech enterprises by offering direct subsidies for small firms′ innovation rather than ex post facto tax breaks. Besides, the government should build convenient financing platforms for high-tech enterprises, increase support for innovative projects with commercial value, and help high-tech enterprises to better balance R&D and innovation investment with capital liquidity. Also, policymakers should include operational capacity into the recognition standards, give appropriate policy preference to enterprises with strong operational capacity, give correct guidance to enterprises with weak operational capacity, and give full play to the incentive effect of policies. Finally, policymakers should adopt differentiated recognition standards and supporting policies according to the life cycle of enterprises.
Key words
high-tech enterprise /
technological innovation /
commercialization of technological achievement /
PSM-DID model
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