Market logic, community logic and choice of location in relocation of headquarters

Wu Bo, Yang Shaodong, Kang Jin

Science Research Management ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (5) : 79-86.

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Science Research Management ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (5) : 79-86.

Market logic, community logic and choice of location in relocation of headquarters

  • Wu Bo1,2, Yang Shaodong1, Kang Jin1
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Abstract

The independence of headquarter (HQ) motivates the HQs relocation of many firms. So where do those firms relocate their HQs, only to the core cities? Previous studies focus on the HQs relocation to the few core cities, and argue that HQ agglomerating advantages pull the HQs into those core cities based on new economic geography theory, i.e. agglomeration-pulling theory. But still many firms relocate HQs to the peripheral cities, i.e. the multi-directional relocating phenomenon, which can′t be covered by the agglomeration-pulling theory. In order to fill this gap, we integrate the multiple institutional logic theory and new economic geography theory to revel the mechanics of HQ multi-directional relocation. Institution logics are different principals which define the values and appropriate practices, and those different institution logics have complementary-yet-conflicting relationships with each other. The agglomeration-pulling theory fellows market logic, which can be used to interpret the HQ relocation to the core cities; and non-market institutional logics, especially community logic, can be used to interpret the HQ relocation to the community which firms are identified.
     Integrating new economic geography theory and multiple institutional logic theory, we argue three hypotheses to reveal the mechanics of HQ multi-directional relocation. Firstly, based on agglomeration-pulling theory, i.e. market logic, we argue the span of HQ agglomerating advantage has positive influence on HQ relocating location choice. That means those HQs are more inclined to move to the core cities pursuing better agglomerating advantages and HQ efficiency. Secondly, based on community logic, we argue the community commitment has positive influence on HQ relocating location choice. That means those HQs are more inclined to move to their belonging cities. And we divide community commitment into firm-regional political ties and controlling shareholder-regional distance, and argue that those cities are more attractive to firm HQs with more firm-regional political ties and shorter controlling shareholder-regional distance. Thirdly, with multiple institutional logic theory, we argue market logic and community logic have interactive effect on HQ relocating location choice, and the later will weakens the positive effect of the former on location choice. Both logics have their own and different definitions on the value and the appropriate practices, where market logic focuses on the economic value and market-based practices to achieve the economic goals, and community logic focuses on the community value and cooperative practices with the community agents to achieve the whole value of the community. So the existence of community logic will weaken the effect of market logic on HQ relocating location choice.
We use Chinese listed companies as the cases and get 126 HQ relocation cases to testify the hypotheses. The result of binary logistic regression analysis indicates the span of HQ agglomerating advantage and firm-regional political tie have positive influence on HQ relocating location choice; and controlling shareholder-regional distance has negative influence on HQ relocating location choice. And the span of HQ agglomerating advantage has negative interactive effect with firm-regional political tie on HQ relocating location choice, and positive interactive effect with controlling shareholder-regional distance. More interesting, the positive interactive effect of the latter is more robust than the former, which means controlling shareholders are more reliable to conduct the decisions on the relocation to the non-agglomerating advantage city following community logic. So, basically the three hypotheses are proved. 
    With the empirical study, three conclusions are drawn. Firstly, market logic and community logic both have significant effect on the location choice of HQ relocation, which provide new factors on the HQ relocation research. Secondly, the existence of community logic weakens the positive effect of market logic. This indicates that community logic and market logic have conflicting prescription on the directions of HQ relocation. So the community-pulling theory is proved. Thirdly, in contrast with firm-regional political tie, controlling shareholder-regional distance has more robust effect on the location choice of HQ relocation, which echoes the internal power view of multiple institutional logic theory.
    Our study has two theoretic contributions. On the one hand, multiple institutional logic theory is introduced and community logic is used to analyze the location choice of HQ relocation, which provides new explanation on HQ multi-directional relocation phenomenon. On the other hand, the empirical study on the location choice decision by Chinese listed companies provides multiple institutional logic theory with more evidences from profit-making organizations. This study identifies the two logics and reveals the tension between the two, which reveals the important role of internal power distribution in the relocating decision following institutional logics. 
    Also, our study has important practical value. For HQ relocating decision, firms should consider and balance economic rationality and community legitimacy. For regional governments, two paths can be used to promote the city attractiveness to HQs. The one is to follow market logic and construct HQ agglomerating advantages, which usually is applied by core first-line cities. And the other is to follow community logic and form the community-oriented city environments to keep and attract HQs, which usually is applied by second-line cities.
    Our study has several limitations, which reveal the future research directions. Firstly, our data are from Chinese listed company, which limits the outside validation. Therefore, in the future, other organizations can be used to testify our model. Secondly, our study focuses on market logic and community logic, so future studies can identify other institutional logics to interpret the HQ multi-directional relocation. Thirdly, our study focuses on the tension between the two logics, and future studies can reveal the complimentary of different institutional logics. Fourthly, our study focuses on the location choice, and future studies can reveal the result of HQ relocation, such as the influence on the organizational legitimacy and economic performance. 

Key words

 headquarter relocation / location choice / headquarter agglomerating advantage / multiple institutional logics / community logic

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Wu Bo, Yang Shaodong, Kang Jin. Market logic, community logic and choice of location in relocation of headquarters[J]. Science Research Management. 2021, 42(5): 79-86

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