A research on the influence mechanism of government innovation subsidies&nbsp;on R&amp;D investment after technology mergers and acquisitions

WANG Wan-Qiu; XING Yue

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Science Research Management ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (4) : 82-91.

A research on the influence mechanism of government innovation subsidies on R&D investment after technology mergers and acquisitions

Wang Wanqiu, Xing Yue

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Abstract

Technology mergers and acquisitions have become an important mean of upgrading the technical and innovational ability. After technology M&A, acquirers need expanding activities in R&D for the technology absorption and integration. Although those companies have a keen desire to innovate, their R&D investment may be restricted by the uncertainty of future cash flows. In this case, government innovation subsidies play a pivotal role on improving acquirers′ R&D investment. In the research of technology M&A, there is few papers on interaction mechanism among government innovation subsidies, R&D investment and cash flows expectation. Tax preference and financial subsidies are two main R&D subsidy policy, and cash flows expectation is divided into internal cash flows expectation and financial misallocation.This paper firstly analyzes the correlation between tax preference and R&D investment of acquirers after technology M&A. And the first hypothesis is that tax preference can promote acquirers′ R&D intensity after technology M&A. Next, this research explores the impact of the other R&D subsidy policy, financial subsidies, on acquirers′ R&D investment after technology M&A. Furthermore, this paper considers the other determinants of expectation on future cash flows, internal cash flows expectation and financial misallocation. Then three hypotheses are proposed: H2: Financial misallocation restricts acquirers′ financing capability and decreases acquirers′ R&D intensity after technology M&A. H3: Financial subsidies have negative effect of financial misallocation on R&D intensity. H4: The negative effect of financial misallocation on R&D intensity will be restrained to the most degree when acquirers have a better expectation of internal cash flows and get more financial subsidies.This research has utilized micro data of listed companies in China from 2008 to 2014 and applied regression analysis to examine how R&D investment is influenced by government innovation subsidies, tax preference and financial subsidies, and cash flows expectation, internal cash flows and financial misallocation. This study takes the M&A events announced by listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the research samples. The filter criteria are as follows：(1) First announcement date of M&A events is between Jan.1,2008 and Dec.31,2014; (2) Acquirers are A - share listed companies, therefore, their financial information are disclosed adequately; (3) There are clear expressions in the M&A announcement that the acquirer obtain key technologies, patents or key technicians of the target company through M&A; (4) M&A events are completed; (5) The stock involved in the transaction is no less than 20%, thus accordingly acquirers have a significant impact on operating decisions of the target company; (6) The ST Inc. are screened out. Eventually we get 285 samples. The dependent variable, acquirers′ R&D investment after technology M&A, is measured by R&D intensity. And two independent variables are tax preference and financial misallocation. Financial subsidies and internal cash flows expectation as moderating variables are established. Three multivariate linear regression models are built to test that four hypotheses.The conclusion contains two aspects. Firstly, acquirers will incline to increasing R&D intensity after technology M&A, when they get more tax preference from the government. Therefore, tax preference can promote acquirers′ R&D intensity directly. Secondly, the direct effect of financial subsidies on acquirers′ R&D intensity after technology M&A is not significant, and the result of regression analysis shows that financial subsidies act on R&D investment indirectly through impacting financial misallocation and internal cash flows expectation. On the one hand, financial misallocation restrains the R&D intensity of acquirers, and financial subsidies negatively moderate the negative effect between financial misallocation and R&D intensity. When acquirers get more financial subsidies, their R&D intensity will be less affected by financial misallocation. On the other hand, there is joint moderation effects of financial subsidies and internal cash flows expectation, which the negative effect of financial misallocation on R&D intensity will be restrained to the most degree when acquirers have a better expectation of internal cash flows and get more financial subsidies.There are four main theory contributions of this study. First, existing researches have proved that R&D investment can promote the absorption and integration of technology. But correlative study on the effect of financial status on technology absorbing and integrating capacity is still a blank field. This paper builds a complete framework for determinants of R&D investment and their interaction mechanism，which includes internal cash flow expectation, financial misallocation and government innovation subsidies, tax preference and financial subsidies, and deepens the absorptive capacity theory. Second, it is a controversial research topic that if government innovation subsidies promote Chinese enterprises′ R&D investment, so this paper studies the interaction mechanism of R&D subsidy policy and cash flows expectation on R&D investment in the technology M&A situation, which have a keen desire on R&D investment after technology M&A. Third, most of researches have validated that investment-cash flow sensitivity exists among Chinese enterprises, thus this paper explores the mechanism of cash flow expectation and R&D investment after technology M&A. The conclusions fill the gaps in the study of solving the problem of investment-cash flow sensitivity and positively contribute to the R&D investment decision making on companies，which having keen-desire on R&D investment and instable cash flow. Fourth, this paper improves the measuring method of financial misallocation. Based on the concept, we measure financial misallocation by the departure of financing cost from return on capital, which can demonstrate financial misallocation between cost and return better.The practical application of this study embodies in three aspects. Firstly, the government should take good advantage of tax preference, and improve the approving and monitoring system of financial subsidies by fully considering the stability of cash flow from financial subsidies. Meanwhile, financial subsidies is still very important for acquirers facing financial misallocation to increase R&D intensity after technology M&A. And government should think through targets′ desire to innovation and internal cash flow during design R&D subsidy policy. Secondly, innovation investment is the endogenous driving force of national sustainable development, and it is very important to promote the adjustment of financial structure, advance market-based reform of financial environment and eliminate incorrect configuration of capital. Thirdly, we deem that acquirers should pay more attention to their cash flow, because it is very important to technology absorption and integration. Based on comprehensive understanding of the R&D subsidy policy, acquirers should forwardly predict, evaluate and improve their operating cash flow and financing capacity after technology M&A.

Key words

technology merger and acquisition / R&D investment / tax preference / financial subsidy / cash flow expectation

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Wang Wanqiu, Xing Yue. A research on the influence mechanism of government innovation subsidies on R&D investment after technology mergers and acquisitions[J]. Science Research Management. 2021, 42(4): 82-91

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