Abstract: This article, which depends on the breakthrough point of Consumer Free Riding Behavior aiming at the closed-loop supply chain system composed of the single manufacturers and retailers, studies how Consumer Free Riding Behavior affects the policy, channel and profit of the different authority structure of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) based on the game theory by constructing the decision-making models of centralized decision, manufacture-Stackelberg game, retailer-Stackelberg game and manufacture-retailer Nash Equilibrium respectively. The research shows that the total profit of the centralized decision-making closed-loop supply chain and the profit of authorities under the decentralized decision-making of the Stackelberg game leading by manufacturer are influenced by the free-riding coefficient. The price of direct channel and market requirement increases with the increase of free riding coefficient in all condition.

Key words: different authority structure, free riding behavior, closed-loop supply chain, decision