International convergence of patent protection breadth implies the standards of patent protection in each region would converge to the same level. This paper extends the model of optimal patents to explain the exist motives of this equilibrium and its convergence path. Firstly, the patent protection breadth is quantified to demonstrate its impact on innovative benefits, the amount of innovation and social welfare etc., and then in accordance with national selection, the reaction function of patent protection breath is calculated to obtain the Nash equilibrium result. The conclusion show that the optimal breath in a country is different with the variance of market size and innovative ability; meanwhile, the unified high standards of patent protection is the second-optimum results of the game among countries, which is propitious to countries advanced in technology to increase innovation earnings from overseas while it is detrimental to global welfare; the optimal protection standards maximizing global welfare is at an intermediate level of each region.
Key words
patent breadth /
international convergence /
innovation incentives /
game equilibrium
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.content}}
References
[1] Joseph E. Stiglitz. Institutional design for china's innovation system-implications from intellectual property rights[EB/OL].http:www2.gsb.columbia.edufacultyjstiglitzindex.cfm.2007
[2] Helpman, E.. Innovation, imitation and intellectual property rights[J].Econometrica. 1993,61 (6):1247-1280.
[3] 倪海青,张岩贵.知识产权保护、FDI技术转移与自主创新[J].世界经济研究,2009(8):58-64.Ni Haiqing, Zhang Yangui.Intellectual property rights protection, FDI technology transfer and innovation[J].World Economy Study,2009,8:58-64.
[4] Scotchmer, Suzanne.The political economy of intellectual property treaties[J].Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 2004,20(2):415-437.
[5] Edwin L.-C. Laia, Larry D. Qiu.The north's intellectual property rights standard for the south?[J]. Journal of International Economics.2003,59:183-209.
[6] Gilbert,R.&C.Shapiro.Optimal patent length and breadth[J]. RAND Journal of Economics. 1990,21(1):106-112.
[7] Gallini,N. and Scotchmer,S. Intellectual property: When is it the best Incentive system?[R].MIT Press.2001.
[8] 寇宗来.专利保护宽度、非侵权模仿与垄断竞争[J].世界经济,2007(1):60-68.Kou Zonglai.Patent breath,costly imitation and monopoly competition[J].The Journal of world Economy, 2007(1):60-68.
[9] 赵旭梅.知识产权保护宽度、企业研发投资和社会福利[J].科研管理,2013,34(7):86-92.Zhao Xumei. Intellectual property scope, R&D investment and social welfare[J].Science Research Management. 2013,34(7):86-92.
[10] Grossman,G..&E. Lai. International protection of intellectual property: Corrigendum[J]. American Economic Review.2006, l96(1):456-467.
[11] 刘勇译.创新与激励[M].上海人民出版社,2010:32.Scotchmer,Suzann,Liu yong.Innovation and Incentives[M].Shanghai Renmin Press,2010:32.
