The innovation mode of generic technology in the industry cluster from the perspective of enterprise contribution

Zhao Hua, Li Jiang, Wei Hongzhu

Science Research Management ›› 2015, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (6) : 53-59.

Science Research Management ›› 2015, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (6) : 53-59.

The innovation mode of generic technology in the industry cluster from the perspective of enterprise contribution

  • Zhao Hua, Li Jiang, Wei Hongzhu
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Abstract

It is of great importance to inspect the industrial cluster enterprise contribution level in generic technology cooperation innovation. By establishing the cluster enterprise duopoly model and analyzing the best contribution level difference between Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality, this paper comes to the proposition that the contribution of Pareto optimality is better than Nash equilibrium. Around this proposition and considering factors of industrial clusters, a cooperative innovation mode is extracted, which is conducive to achieving Pareto optimality for cluster enterprises in generic technology cooperation innovation. Furthermore, an organization operation mechanism is designed from the perspective of contract justice. In the end, the feasibility of the mode is proved by successful case.

Key words

contribution level / industry cluster / generic technology / cooperation mode

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Zhao Hua, Li Jiang, Wei Hongzhu. The innovation mode of generic technology in the industry cluster from the perspective of enterprise contribution[J]. Science Research Management. 2015, 36(6): 53-59

References

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