Executive ownership：convergence of interest effects or entrenchment effects&mdash;An empirical analysis of listed companies on GEM

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Science Research Management ›› 2014, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (7) : 116-123.

Executive ownership：convergence of interest effects or entrenchment effects—An empirical analysis of listed companies on GEM

Mei Shiqiang, Wei Haoqiang

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Abstract

This paper expands the research scope of the impact of executive ownership on firm value to the GEM, and comes to different conclusions with other scholars. The results suggest that GEM's corporate governance structure and ownership structure are obviously different from the main board and SME board. This is an important reason that the impact of GEM's executive ownership on firm value is different from other research conclusions. Through empirically analyzing the sample of companies listed on GEM in 2010 and 2011, we could find that both the convergence of interest effects and the entrenchment effects exist in the listed companies. When the ratio of executive ownership is below 20% or over 50%, the convergence of interest effects play a more important role than the entrenchment effects; On the other hand, when the ratio is within 20% to 50%, the reverse is true and the entrenchment effects play a more powerful role.

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executive ownership / convergence of interest effect / entrenchment effect / GEM

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Mei Shiqiang, Wei Haoqiang. Executive ownership：convergence of interest effects or entrenchment effects—An empirical analysis of listed companies on GEM[J]. Science Research Management. 2014, 35(7): 116-123

References

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