In a manufacturers' collecting and remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer, in consideration of the Nash equilibrium game existing among the system members, the Stackelberg game led by the manufacturers, the Stackelberg game led by the retailers and other right relations, this paper studies and compares the pricing decisions and profits problem of the three decentralized decision-making CLSC models. The research results indicate that: in the markets led by manufacturers, the retail price of the retailers has a positive correlation with the wholesale price of the products obtained; in the markets led by the retailers, the manufacturers' wholesale price and return rate have a negative correlation with the retail price of the retailers; the potential expected income of the recovered products is the driving factor for the recovery activities. In the decentralized decision-making CLSC, when there is no leader in the market, the consumers will get most profit and the CLSC is more favorable to the resources consumption. Moreover, both the manufacturer and the retailer have the motivation to be leaders, and they will get more power, bargaining capacity and profits. In comparison, in the centralized decision-making CLSC, the retail price is lowest, the return rate and total channel profits are highest. Finally, we design the revenue sharing contract to coordinate the three decentralized decision-making CLSC models.
Key words
closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) /
game theory /
decentralized decision-making /
centralized decision-making /
coordination
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