Green operation of enterprises is a major way to achieve the social sustainable development. The main purpose of the research is to solve the problem of the limited motivation for implementing enterprise green strategy under current domestic circumstance. By using the evolutionary game theory, the evolution of enterprises operation mode with free market mechanism is discussed, and the role playing by government for facilitating the diffusion of green operation mode is analyzed. The results manifest that it is difficult to make all enterprises apply green operation mode with free market mechanism in developing regions, and government regulations are extremely important. With the case analysis, from the micro-operational view, the supervision and incentives of government as well as its adjustable strategies are proposed. From the mesoscopic policies view, certain government measures, for example increasing the regulation intensity to the leading enterprise, taking full advantage of public monitoring, and regulating existent green business certification systems, are given. The results help Chinese modern manufacturing enterprises to develop, as well as the government sustainable development policies to implement.
Key words
manufacturing /
government regulation /
green operation mode /
evolutionary game
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