On the condition of incomplete information, a game model is used to investigate the impact of ownership level and learning ability on the stability of technology innovation alliance from a perspective of knowledge transfer. The decision-making processes of involved parties are divided into two stages in the model. In the first stage, the firm possessing advanced technology decides on the level of knowledge that transfers to its alliance partners. In the second stage, based on two factors, that is, the level of knowledge learned and profits gained, the alliance members decide on whether to maintain or terminate the alliance. The outcomes of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the model are able to reveal when the parties decide to maintain or terminate the alliance. The model explores the status of alliance stability under different ownership levels and learning abilities in order to provide theoretical support for the selection of optimal dynamic competitive-cooperative relationship and alliance operations.
Key words
technology innovation alliance /
knowledge transfer /
alliance stability /
dynamic Game
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.content}}
References
[1] Dyer J H. How to make strategic alliances Work [J]. Sloan Management Review. 2001, 42 (4):37-43.
[2] Inkpen A C, Beamish P W. Knowledge, bargaining power and international joint venture instability [J]. Academy of Management Review. 1997, 22(1):177-202.
[3] Yan A, Zeng M. International joint venture instability: a critique of previous research, a reconceptualization, and directions for future research [J]. Journal of International Business Studies. 1999, 30 (2): 397-414.
[4] Daellenbach U S, Davenport S J. Establishing trust during the formation of technology alliances [J]. Journal of Technology Transfer. 2004, 29 (2): 187-202.
[5] Jiang Zhang-sheng, Hu Long-ying and Chen Ke-ke. Decisions of knowledge transfer in technology innovation alliance: a stackelberg leader-followers model [J]. Operational Research. 2010, 10(2): 231-242.
[6] Gravier M J, Randall W S, Strutton D. Investigating the role of knowledge in alliance performance [J]. Journal of Knowledge Management. 2008, 12(4):117-130.
[7] Yeung D W K, Petrosyan L. Dynamically stable corporate joint venture [J]. Automatica. 2006,42: 365-370.
[8] Walter J, Lechner C, Kellermanns F W. Knowledge transfer between and within alliance partners: private versus collective benefits of social capital [J]. Journal of Business Research. 2007, 60 (7):698-710.
[9] Kabiraj T, Chowdhury P R. Adoption of new technology and joint venture instability [J]. Research in International Business and Finance. 2008,22:108-123.
[10] B醨cena-Ruiz J C, Espinosa M P. Should multiproduct firms provide divisional or corporate incentives?[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization. 1999, 17(5): 751-764.
[11] Yeung D W K, Petrosyan L. Cooperative stochastic differential games [J]. Springer, New York. 2006,15: 360-368.
PDF(1534 KB)
