A model of dynamic game theory is developed to analyze market performance of Double Competitive Patent Pools (DCPP). The market structure consists two parts, one is the upstream market of patent standard licensing, and the other is the downstream market of differentiated products based on different standards. Backward induction is used to solve sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium under DCPP and compare with the market performance of single patent pool by means of comparative static analysis. The conclusion indicates that DCPP has better market performance. For the downstream market, there are lower license royalty, lower profit, and more competitions, meanwhile for same market, there are more enterprises that enter into, lower final product price, more output, and better consumer surplus.
Key words
technical standard /
single patent pool /
DCPP /
market performance
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References
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