The game of cost-profit about intellectual property rights betweeninfringement and anti-infringement

Abstract

Abstract: Because of information asymmetry and deviation of market-oriented interests, the infringements of intellectual property right appear repeatedly and are unable to stop. By analyzing the choice tendency of potential infringement and anti-infringement comparatively through the game model of cost-profit, some conclusions are drawn from the analyses and an inherent explanation for the behavior of infringement and anti-infringement resulted from direct and dynamic causes is obtained. At the same time it could provide a quite clear economic approach to intellectual property right protection.

Key words: intellectual property right protection, cost-profit, potential infringe, game model

CLC Number:

F062.3

Zhang Wei, Sun Yanling. The game of cost-profit about intellectual property rights betweeninfringement and anti-infringement[J]. Science Research Management, 2012, 33(5): 86-94.

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