The risk caused by patent grant delay and its effect

Wen Jiachun

PDF(912 KB)

Science Research Management ›› 2012, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (5) : 139-145.

The risk caused by patent grant delay and its effect

Wen Jiachun

Author information +

History +

Abstract

Under the multiple influencial factors, almost all the patent offices across the world including Chinese patent office are now facing the increasingly severe overstock problem, which results in the risk of patent grant delay. The impacts caused by patent grant delay is explored by analyzing the underlying influential factors; meanwhile, by constructing a simple model, it is found that the patent grant delay will distort competition and impair technological innovation. Therefore, it is suggested that Chinese patent office should reform the patent examination model immediately and formulate policies cautiously. When making patent-related policies, American patent rapid examination pattern should be used for reference. However more importantly, by setting and modulating request fees in the pattern of fast examination to bring the total number of applications for patent rapid examination under the control.

Key words

patent grant delay / market effect / technology innovation effect / patent rapid examination

Cite this article

EndNote

Ris (Procite)

Bibtex

Download Citations

Wen Jiachun. The risk caused by patent grant delay and its effect[J]. Science Research Management. 2012, 33(5): 139-145

References

[1] Eugenio, A., Dominique, G., Niels, S., Bruno P., Nicolas V. Z. When small is beautiful: measuring the evolution and consequences of the voluminosity of patent applications at the EPO [J], Information Economics and Policy, 2007, 19: 103-132.
[2] Gaetan, R. and Bruno, P. A policy insight into the R&D-patent relationship [J], Research Policy, 2009, 38(5): 779-792.
[3] Cohen, W. M., Richard, R. N. and John P. W. Protecting their intellectual assets: appropriability conditions and why US manufacturing firms patent (or not) . NBER Working paper, 2000, No.W7552, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
[4] Blind, K. and Nikulaus, T. Interrelation between patenting and standardization strategies: empirical evidence and policy implications [J], Research Policy, 2004, 33(10):1583-1598.
[5] Jun, S. and Kiminori, G. Analysis of propensity to patent and science-dependence of large Japanese manufacturers of electrical machinery [J], Scientometrics, 2006, 68(2):265-288.
[6] Xie, Y. and Giles, D. A survival analysis of the approval of U.S. Patent Applications [J]. Applied Economics, 2011, 43(11) : 1375-1384.
[7] Harhoff, D. and Wagner, S. Modeling the duration of patent examination at the European Patent Office [J]. Management Science, 2009, 55(12): 1969-1984.
[8] Popp, D., Ted, J. and Daniel, K.N. Johnson. Time in purgatory: determinants of the grant lag for U.S. patent applications [J]. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2004, 4 (1): 123-146.
[9] Josh, L. 150 years of patent office practice , NBER Working Paper, 2000, No.7477.
[10] Paul, H. J., Alfons, P. and Elizabeth, W. Patent application outcomes across the trilateral patent offices . Melbourne Institute Working Paper, 2005, No. 5/05.
[11] Paul, H. J., Alfons, P. and Elizabeth, W. Application pendency times and outcomes across four patent offices , Melbourne Institute Working Paper, 2008, No.01/08.
[12] Nicolas, v. Z. Patents only live twice: a patent survival analysis of the determinants of examination lags, grant decisions, and renewals , September IAMOT 2009.
[13] Isamu, Y. and Sadao, N. Complementary reforms of patent examination request system in Japan , Institute of Innovation Research Working Paper, 2008, No.08/07.
[14] Amitrajeet A.B. and Gregory J.D. Average patent pendency and examination errors: a queuing theoretic analysis [J]. International Journal of Foresight and Innovation Policy, 2008, 4(2):112- 128.
[15] Reitzig, M. Improving patent valuations for management purposes-validating new indicators by analyzing application rationales [J]. Research Policy, 2004, 33(6): 939-957.
[16] Regibeau, P. and Rockett, K. Are more important patents approved more slowly and should they be ? Economics Discussion Papers 556, University of Essex, Department of Economics, 2009.
[17] Bernard, C. and Anne, D. Patent office in innovation policy: Nobody's perfect [J], International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2011, 29(2): 242-252.
[18] Arrow, K. Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention, In R.Nelson, ed., the Rate and Direction of Inventive Activities: Economic and Social Factors [M]. Princeton University Press, 1962, 620.