Along with economical and technical globalization, the protection for the foreign innovation become the major function of patent system, nevertheless, the most countries in the world actually adopt same protection mode with the domestic innovation. The necessity to differentiate the protection of the domestic and foreign innovations is studied, the design plan of the respective protection system is proposed and a feasibility analysis is conducted. It is argued that foreign innovation and domestic innovation have different impacts on the national social welfare, therefore it is necessary to differentiate their patent protection, and it is also the result of the international non-cooperation game. A plan which adopts the integrated examination or grand system under the multilateral most-favored treatment principle is suggested in order to protect the foreign innovation; in the meantime the domestic patent system should be adopted for protecting the domestic innovations.
Key words
patent system /
innovation /
foreign /
domestic /
respective protection
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