R&amp;D intensity and executive compensationbased on China's listed IT companies

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Science Research Management ›› 2011, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (9) : 55-62.

R&D intensity and executive compensationbased on China's listed IT companies

Chen Shenglan

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Abstract

R&D investment is both an impetus for growth and a source of competitive advantage for IT companies. The executive compensation plan based on company performance may impede the R&D investment. The relationship between the R&D investment and the executive compensation in China's listed IT companies is examined. The result indicates that the boards of director respond to and promote the R&D investment through the executive compensation plans. The result also suggests that the executive compensation plans are more likely to focus on the top management teams than on the CEOs.

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R&D / executive compensation / innovation

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Chen Shenglan. R&D intensity and executive compensationbased on China's listed IT companies[J]. Science Research Management. 2011, 32(9): 55-62

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