The contribution factors of the dilemmas of performance managementin Chinese state-owned enterprises:A field tracking research on the performance management project of G Airport Group

Abstract

Abstract: The implementation of performance management of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises(SOE) depends on the agent's motive. This motive rests with the cost-benefit for the agent, and technical factor is just one of the factors affecting the cost-benefit. By establishing the cost-benefit model based on the agent implementation of performance management, several influences caused by the features of SOE on the cost-benefit of the agent are depicted. By the field tracking research on the process for implementing performance management of a typical SOE i.e. G Airport Group, the existence of these influences is confirmed, their mechanism is defined, and the dilemma of performance management in SOE is explained. For the agents, performance management is a long-term investment. The property right attribute and organizational culture of SOE make the investment period too long, with the short-term behavior tendency of the agent and their limited rationality, all of which lead to the loss of the performance management project. Essentially, the absence for the right of agent’s residual claims is the root which causes the dilemma of performance management in SOE.

Key words: state-owned enterprise, dilemma of performance management, cost-benefit for agent

CLC Number:

F272.92

Mu Sheng. The contribution factors of the dilemmas of performance managementin Chinese state-owned enterprises:A field tracking research on the performance management project of G Airport Group[J]. Science Research Management, 2011, 32(6): 75-83.

References

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