The industrial cluster is a dynamic supply chain network system. Based on strong ties and weak ties of industrial relations in the cluster, the horizontal symmetrical evolutionary model and vertical asymmetric evolutionary model of cooperative behavior are proposed, and its evolutionary path and impact factors are studied. The results show that the evolutionary result of cooperative behavior depends on the initial status, assets return, return adjustment, and network income of the cluster enterprises. Finally, some proposals for promoting cooperation in industrial cluster are put forward.
Key words
supply chain network /
industrial cluster /
cooperative behavior /
evolutionary game
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.title}}
{{custom_sec.content}}
References
[1] Dewitt T, Larry C and Melton L. Clusters and supply chain management: the Amish experience [J].International Journal of Physical Distribution and Logistics Management, 2006, 36(4): 289-308.
[2] 黎继子, 蔡根女. 基于cluster供应链组织系统体系结构[J]. 科研管理, 2004, 25(3): 77-80.
[3] 夏德, 程国平. 企业集群与供应链的共生性研究[J]. 研究与发展管理, 2003, 15(6): 62-66.
[4] 李凯, 李世杰. 装备制造业集群网络结构研究与实证[J]. 管理世界, 2004(12): 68-76.
[5] 戚桂清, 杨锡怀, 李森. 基于重复博弈的集群供应链网络竞合关系分析[J]. 东北大学学报(自然科学版), 2006,27(2): 233-236.
[6] Granovetter M. The strength of weak ties [J]. American Journal of Sociology, 1973, 78(6): 1360-1380.
[7] 周小虎, 陈传明. 企业社会资本与持续竞争优势[J]. 中国工业经济, 2004(5): 90-96.
[8] Friedman D. Evolutionary games in economics [J]. Economitrican, 1991(59): 637-639.
[9] Burt S. The contingent value of social capital [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1997, 42: 339-365.
PDF(1007 KB)
