Licensing behavior of patent pools based on the game models

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Science Research Management ›› 2011, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (11) : 63-70.

Liu Li^1,2, Zhu Xuezhong¹

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Abstract

As the core problem of patent pools, patent licensing of all kinds is the gaming process between the two parties in essence with the result is weather for not the contract for licensing is signed. Based on game models, the inner mechanism of patent pool licensing behavior is discussed from two aspects. Regardless of the kind of patent licensing, the relationship between the two parties is both competition and cooperation with the aim at maximizing their own profits. Only when the two parties gain their expected profits, then a gaming balance appears. In view of this, some enlightenment for Chinese enterprises on how to treat patent pool licensing correctly and appropriately are provided.

Key words

patent pool / licensing / game / profit / competition and cooperation

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Liu Li, Zhu Xuezhong. Licensing behavior of patent pools based on the game models[J]. Science Research Management. 2011, 32(11): 63-70

References

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