Analysis on the monitor and incentive game of the entrust-agency relationship in venture capital

Science Research Management ›› 2007, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (1): 156-161.

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Analysis on the monitor and incentive game of the entrust-agency relationship in venture capital

Dang Xing-hua¹, Quan Xiao-feng², Yang Min-li¹

1. School of Business Administration, Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710048, China;
2. School of Geography and Resource Management, Ludong University, Yantai 264025, China

Received:2005-05-26 Online:2007-01-24 Published:2011-05-16

Abstract

Abstract: A dynamic game model on the action strategies between venture entrepreneur and venture capitalist is built.Based on the model,an analysis on the incentive mechanism for the venture entrepreneur,monitor mechanism of the venture capitalist and correlation is made.It is concluded that from the aspect of the venture entrepreneur,the monitor mechanism and the incentive contract is complement;but from the aspect of the venture capitalist,the monitor mechanism and the incentive contract is alternative.Then combining with the parameter analysis,the variable factors between the best incentive strength and the generalized monitor strength is researched.

Key words: entrust agency, informational asymmetry, monitor, incentive, game

CLC Number:

Dang Xing-hua, Quan Xiao-feng, Yang Min-li. Analysis on the monitor and incentive game of the entrust-agency relationship in venture capital[J]. Science Research Management, 2007, 28(1): 156-161.

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Analysis on the monitor and incentive game of the entrust-agency relationship in venture capital

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