Analysis on the monitor and incentive game of the entrust-agency relationship in venture capital

Dang Xing-hua, Quan Xiao-feng, Yang Min-li

Science Research Management ›› 2007, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (1) : 156-161.

PDF(1070 KB)
PDF(1070 KB)
Science Research Management ›› 2007, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (1) : 156-161.

Analysis on the monitor and incentive game of the entrust-agency relationship in venture capital

  • Dang Xing-hua1, Quan Xiao-feng2, Yang Min-li1
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Abstract

A dynamic game model on the action strategies between venture entrepreneur and venture capitalist is built.Based on the model,an analysis on the incentive mechanism for the venture entrepreneur,monitor mechanism of the venture capitalist and correlation is made.It is concluded that from the aspect of the venture entrepreneur,the monitor mechanism and the incentive contract is complement;but from the aspect of the venture capitalist,the monitor mechanism and the incentive contract is alternative.Then combining with the parameter analysis,the variable factors between the best incentive strength and the generalized monitor strength is researched.

Key words

entrust agency / informational asymmetry / monitor / incentive / game

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Dang Xing-hua, Quan Xiao-feng, Yang Min-li. Analysis on the monitor and incentive game of the entrust-agency relationship in venture capital[J]. Science Research Management. 2007, 28(1): 156-161
PDF(1070 KB)

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