The pledge financing mode, predicament and countermeasures based on patent signals

Abstract

Abstract: For technology-based SMEs, patent pledge financing can not only maximize the application of patent technology, but also solve the financing problems of enterprises. However, due to the lack of a relatively complete financial information disclosure mechanism, banks are often unable to provide patent pledge financing services for small and medium-sized enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises with small scale and low output value are often difficult to obtain financing support in the actual operation process. In order to further solve the financing problems of small and medium-sized enterprises, and considering the problems of unstable profitability and opaque financial information, the government began to promote the construction of a new patent pledge financing mode focusing on the technological innovation ability of enterprises.
In order to promote the smooth implementation of the new patent pledge financing mode focusing on the enterprise′s scientific and technological innovation ability, this paper analyzes the market equilibrium state of the implementation of the financing mode by using the signal game model, and studies the dilemma of its implementation combined with the parameters of the game model. The results show that there are "patent pledge financing market failure" and "pledge financing market inefficiency" in the implementation process of this financing mode. It is suggested that the government should take measures to increase the economic cost, technical cost and dishonest cost of patent quantity camouflage, so as to ensure the effective operation of patent pledge financing market. On this basis, the combination of loan subsidies and science and technology policy tools can control the number of enterprises that can be financed, so as to improve the overall market efficiency of patent pledge financing.
This paper studies the patent pledge financing mode from the perspective of financial service mechanism innovation, which provides a new research perspective and ideas for patent pledge financing mode. In addition, this paper discusses the function mechanism of patent signal in enterprise pledge financing, which provides a new way to solve the information asymmetry between banks and enterprises, and enriches the related research of signal theory in patent pledge financing. From the perspective of practice, the patent pledge financing mode focusing on the enterprise′s scientific and technological innovation ability is still in the exploration and pilot stage, and the government has only issued guiding policies to promote the implementation of the new patent pledge financing mode. As for the problems that may exist in the implementation of the new model and how to solve them, the relevant policy documents have not made further explanation. Therefore, based on the perspective of patent signal, this paper studies the implementation difficulties and solutions of the new patent pledge financing mode, trying to provide a reference for the government to promote the implementation of the new patent pledge financing mode. In summary, this study has direct practical significance to promote the implementation of the new patent pledge financing mode and ease the financing constraints of small and medium-sized enterprises. To a certain extent, it also makes an important contribution to promoting the technological innovation of small and medium-sized enterprises and promoting the healthy development of national science and technology finance.

Key words: patent pledge, financing mode, patent signal, signal game

Hu Cheng, Zhu Xuezhong. The pledge financing mode, predicament and countermeasures based on patent signals[J]. Science Research Management, 2021, 42(3): 109-119.

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