Science Research Management ›› 2014, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (8): 145-152.

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Evolutionary game analysis on local government supervision and rare earth upstream enterprises

Song Zhijie, GuoYanping, Cui Dongchu   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Yanshan University, Qinhuangdao 066004, Hebei, China
  • Received:2013-10-01 Revised:2014-05-01 Online:2014-08-25 Published:2014-08-21

Abstract: Local government regulators and rare earth upstream enterprises are two important bodies in the rare earth upstream regulating market, and the interests of them both have a certain dynamic. In this paper, we established the evolutionary game model of local government regulators and rare earth upstream and then used matlab simulation software to analyze the findings. We found out that it is helpful to regulate the rare earth upstream market order by lowering the regulatory costs of local government regulatory authorities, increasing the punishment of upstream rare earth's illegal behavior, increasing the central government's subsidies to local governments and building a good external relationship for the rare earth upstream companies.

Key words: rare earth upstream enterprises, local government supervision, evolutionary game

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