Research on the evolutionary game between follower and leading firms in the breakthrough of

doi:10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2025.01.013

Abstract

Abstract: Due to the competitive responses of leading firms, many firms that have successfully achieved "bottleneck" technological breakthroughs have been trapped on the way to profit from innovation. How to profit from breakthroughs of core technologies has become an urgent problem that needs to be solved for follower firms. Based on different technological breakthrough strategies of the follower firms and various response strategies of the leading firms regarding follower firms′ innovation breakthrough, this paper constructed an evolutionary game model for the competitive interaction between the follower and leading firms in core technological breakthroughs. This paper analyzed the evolutionary paths of the strategic choices of the follower and leading firms under different circumstances. The results indicated that: first, the final strategic choices of both parties are not affected by government subsidies for follower firms. Second, the initial probabilities of various strategy choices by both parties affect the stable equilibrium strategies. Third, the key factors affecting the stable equilibrium strategies are the impact of price reduction measures taken by leading firms on follower firms and the loss to leading firms, as well as the differences in R&D costs of different breakthrough strategies adopted by follower firms. The research has extended the Profit-From-Innovation theory and the competitive dynamics theory. Besides, this research will have a positive effect on guiding Chinese firms to avoid the profit trap in innovation breakthroughs.

Key words: "bottleneck" technology, profit from innovation, evolutionary game, dynamic competition

Wu Yong, Wei Zelong, Sun Peiyu. Research on the evolutionary game between follower and leading firms in the breakthrough of "bottleneck" technologies[J]. Science Research Management, 2025, 46(1): 123-133.

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Research on the evolutionary game between follower and leading firms in the breakthrough of "bottleneck" technologies

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