Science Research Management ›› 2014, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (4): 111-120.

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The game analysis of enterprises’ R&D innovation strategyunder crowdsourcing contest mode

Hao Linna1, Hou Wenhua1, Liu Meng2   

  1. 1. School of business, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China;
    2. College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
  • Received:2012-11-20 Revised:2013-11-29 Online:2014-04-25 Published:2014-04-25

Abstract: The enterprises' R&D innovation require effective use of internal and external resources. As a new mode of innovation, crowdsourcing contest has drawn a widely public attention due to its full use of the public's intelligence for enterprises' R&D innovation. Considering the existence of spillover effects, we developed a game model to analyze the optimal innovation mode and investment policy of enterprises. When crowdsourcing contest is selected, we further discussed the corresponding decisions if the relationship between enterprises is competitive or cooperative, and analyzed the influence of these decisions on R&D innovation. The results showed that, when a reasonable bonus was set, the strategy that combining use of internal innovation and crowdsourcing contest innovation (B strategy) was better than that solely relying on the internal innovation (A strategy). Given B strategy, different spillover effects would affect the level of R&D innovation of crowdsourcing contest mode, under both competition and cooperation situation. Meanwhile, the contribution of the crowdsourcing contest was positively related to many factors, including enterprise income, the level of R&D innovation, consumer surplus and social welfare. Finally, a case of P&G Company is used to verify the corresponding conclusions of the paper.

Key words: crowdsourcing contest, R&D innovation, spillover effects, game analysis

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