Abstract:    To effectively promote the innovation-driven high-quality development, it is necessary to explore how to overcome the formal and strategic limitations of technological innovation and construct a driving mechanism for high-quality innovation in state-owned enterprises from the perspective of executive incentives. Based on the framework of principal-agent theory, this study utilized the data from A-share state-owned listed companies to examine the influence and mechanism of executive reputation on high-quality innovation of state-owned enterprises from multiple dimensions. The results demonstrated that executive reputation promotes the high-quality innovation in state-owned enterprises effectively. The mechanism test showed that executive reputation drives the high-quality innovation by providing incentive compensation, enhancing principal-agent efficiency, and improving the level of executive risk-taking. The heterogeneity test revealed that contextual factors such as characteristics of high-tech industries and degree of marketization strengthen the positive effect of executive reputation on the high-quality innovation in state-owned enterprises. This paper has verified the effective contract hypothesis of executive reputation from the perspective of high-quality innovation, expanded the application boundaries of principal-agent theory, and will provide a new theoretical perspective and practical pathway for the innovation management of state-owned enterprises.

Key words: executive reputation, high-quality innovation, state-owned enterprise, driving mechanism