A research on the incentive and restraint mechanism of indirect costs of government research projects

Xiao Xiaoxi, Tang Fujie

Science Research Management ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (6) : 159-165.

PDF(2245 KB)
PDF(2245 KB)
Science Research Management ›› 2021, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (6) : 159-165.

A research on the incentive and restraint mechanism of indirect costs of government research projects

  • Xiao Xiaoxi1,2, Tang Fujie3,4
Author information +
History +

Abstract

    At present, the key problem in governmental research project funding management in China is how to establish an effective incentive and restraint mechanism. From the perspective of the incentives mechanism, in recent years, the introduction of indirect costs has replaced the previous management overhead fees. Besides this, currently performance allowance is permitted in indirect costs, and the limit of personnel costs proportion is abolished, all of which demonstrate that China′s governmental research funding management has entered a new stage characterized by incentive orientation and strengthen the financial autonomy of project performers such as universities and research institutes. However, there are still some challenges to be addressed. For example, as the policy barriers from the central government have been removed, how to make sure researchers really benefit from this? Compared with the value of equipment and infrastructure, the value of human resources has been underestimated in project funding management for a long time. How to truly reflect the creativity of scientific researchers in indirect costs of the governmental research project? 
    From the perspective of constraint mechanism, the responsibility of the project performing organizations such as universities and research institutes has increased after the emphasis of financial autonomy for these organizations. How to effectively restrict the project performing organizations from illegal behaviors, and make sure they will undertake the responsibility to make the governmental project′s funds legally and effectively managed? At the national level, in recent years it is required to implement the credit management of scientific research projects and promote the verification of indirect costs of scientific research projects by linking it with the credits of the performing organizations. In fact, it is necessary and important to link the credit management with the indirect costs, so as to effectively encourage the performing organizations and researchers to make the best use of the governmental project funds, and also restrict them from illegal behaviors. In another word, linking credit with indirect costs management is vital to build effective incentive and restraint mechanism in governmental project funding management, and solve the above problems. 
    It can be seen that under the trend of credit management, how to establish an effective incentive and restraint mechanism through the indirect costs of financial research projects is not only an important theoretical research topic in indirect cost management, but also an important policy topic. The existing studies about the indirect costs management of governmental research projects, mainly introduced domestic and foreign practical experiences. In-depth theoretical analysis on how to establish an effective and balanced incentive and constraint mechanism is rare in these studies. Therefore, these studies have limited value in inspiring China′s mechanism design. Based on the incentive and restraint framework of the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes and compares the incentive and restraint mechanisms in the indirect costs management of governmental research projects in the United States, Britain and China. Then the necessity and importance of establishing the incentive and restraint mechanism by linking the credit management with the indirect costing of governmental research projects in China are illustrated. Finally, this paper puts forward the basic framework and key points to improve the indirect costs management of governmental research projects in China under the trend of credit management, so as to play a supporting role in the construction of effective incentive and restraint mechanism in governmental research project fund management.

Key words

credit management / indirect costs / incentive / restraint

Cite this article

Download Citations
Xiao Xiaoxi, Tang Fujie. A research on the incentive and restraint mechanism of indirect costs of government research projects[J]. Science Research Management. 2021, 42(6): 159-165

References

[1]Sappington DIncentives in principal-agent relationships [J]Journal of Economic Perspectives19915: 45-66.

[2]拉丰, 马赫蒂摩(著), 陈志俊等(译). 激励理论(第一卷):委托-代理模型[M]. 北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2002.

Laffont J J, Martimort D (ed). The theory of incentives: The principal-agent model[M]. Beijing: China Renmin University Press,2002.

[3]Dietmar B. Lasting tensions in research policy-making - A delegation problem[J].Science and Public Policy, 2003, 30(5) :309-321

[4]李枫, 吕廷杰, 吕嘉,. 基于委托代理理论的高校科研经费管理问题研究[J]. 北京邮电大学学报(社会科学版), 2015, 17(3):106-110

Li Feng, Lyu Tingjie, Lyu Jia, et al. University research funds management based on principal-agent theory[J]. Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition) , 2015, 17(3):106-110

[5]阿儒涵, 李晓轩. 我国政府科技资源配置的问题分析[J]. 科学学研究, 2014, 32(2):276-281.

Ruhan, Li Xiaoxuan. A study on the problems of government scientific research funding[J]. Studies in Science of Science, 2014, 32(2):276-281.

[6]黄宁清. 基于委托代理关系下基础研究科研单位科研项目管理问题及对策[J]. 科技管理研究, 2009(09):224-226.

Huang Ningqing. A study on research project management problems and countermeasures in basic research institutes based on principal-agent relationship[J]. Science and Technology Management Research, 2009(09):224-226.

[7]刘卫民, 杨媚, 易智敏,. 高校纵向科研经费问责研究——基于委托代理理论[J]. 会计之友, 2017, (6):69-72.

Liu Weiming, Yang Mei, Yi Zhimin, et al. Research on the accountability of university research funds from central government --Based on principal-agent theory[J]. Friends of Accounting, 2017, (6):69-72.

[8]张清. 委托代理视角下高校科研经费管理中的道德风险及其防范[J]. 中国内部审计, 2012(7):52-54.

Zhang Qing. Moral hazard and its prevention in the management of scientific research funds in universities from the perspective of principal agent[J]. Internal Auditing in China, 2012(7):52-54.

[9]肖小溪, 李晓轩. 科研项目承担单位信用内涵及形成机理研究[J]. 科学学研究, 2018, 36(9): 1632-1636.

Xiao Xiaoxi, Li Xiaoxuan. Studies on connotation and mechanism of organizational credits for research program performers[J]. Studies in Science of Science, 2018, 36(9): 1632-1636.

[10] NSF. Indirect cost rate proposal submission procedures [EB/OL]. 2017. https://www.nsf.gov/bfa/dias/caar/docs/idcsubmissions.pdf.

[11] HEFCE. How HEFCE takes account of full economic costs in the funding we distribute for higher education [EB/OL]. 2005.

https://www.trac.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/tracfec.pdf.

[12]张艳,杨允仙,唐安,焦艳. 新形势下科研经费管理评价研究[J].科研管理, 2016,37(S1):296-300.

Zhang Yan, Yang Yunxian, Tang An, Jiao Yan.A research on evaluation of scientific research funds management under new situations[J].Science Research Management, 2016,37(S1):296-300.

[13]顾全.科研项目经费管理:中英比较研究[J].科研管理, 2012,33(1):120-126.

Gu Quan. RD project funding managementComparative study between China and British[J].Science Research Management, 2012,33(1):120-126.

[14]United States GAOPolicies for the reimbursement of indirect costs need to be updated [EB/OL]. 2010. https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10937.pdf.

[15] MacDonald G. Research councils UK funding assurance overview [EB/OL]. 2017. https://armaconference.com/downloads/Overview%20of%20Development%20in%20RCUK%20Funding.pdf

[16]吴勇,朱卫东,刘卫,马建,刘海波.国家自然科学基金依托单位信用评价体系研究[J].中国科学基金, 2019,33(2): 154-161.

Wu Yong, Zhu Weidong, Liu Wei, Ma Jian, Liu Haibo. Credit evaluation system for applicant organizations of NSFC[J]. Bulletin of National Science Foundation of China, 2019,33(2): 154-161.

[]高健,徐耀玲.中央财政科研项目经费使用单位信用评价研究[J].中国科技论坛,2018,(2):23-29.

Gao Jian, Xu Yaoling. Credit evaluation for central financial research project implementation institutes[J]. Forum on Science and Technology in China, 2018,(2):23-29.

PDF(2245 KB)

Accesses

Citation

Detail

Sections
Recommended

/