The optimal emission reduction and pricing strategies and coordination based on the perspective of supply chain under carbon tax policy

Abstract

Abstract: In view of the fact that many scholars have studied the effect of carbon tax on emission reduction and firm's production decision from the macroscopic and microcosmic aspects, this paper initially establishes the centralized and decentralized decision-making models from the perspective of supply chain, then discusses respectively the optimal carbon dioxide emission reductions and pricing strategies for the manufacturer and retailer, and the impact of carbon tax rate on carbon dioxide emission reductions and product sale price. Some results show that the carbon dioxide emission reductions of per-unit product not only depend on the government's carbon tax rate, but also relate to its initial carbon dioxide emissions and the choices of decision-making in supply chain. In addition, there is the problem of "double marginalization" under the decentralized decision-making with carbon tax policy, so we coordinate supply chain with the two-part tariff contract. Finally, we further verify the conclusions by using numerical simulations, and give a number of suggestions and strategies for improving the efficiency of emission reduction for the supply chain.

Key words: supply chain, carbon tax, abatement costs, two-part tariff contract, game theory

CLC Number:

F272.3

Cheng Yonghong, Xiong Zhongkai. The optimal emission reduction and pricing strategies and coordination based on the perspective of supply chain under carbon tax policy[J]. Science Research Management, 2015, 36(6): 81-91.

References

[1] 国务院发展研究中心课题组.全球温室气体减排:理论框架和解决方案[J].经济研究, 2009(3):4-13.Project Team of Development Research Center of the State Council of China.Greenhouse gas emissions reduction:A theoretical framework and global solution[J].Economic Research Journal, 2009(3):4-13.(in Chinese) [2] Bernard P H, Jose T R.An international carbon tax to combat global warming:An economic and political analysis of the European Union proposal [J].American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 1995, 54(3):257-267. [3] European Environment Agency (EEA).Environmental taxes implementation and environmental effectiveness [M].Copenhagen:EEA, 1996. [4] Pearce D.The role of carbon taxes in adjusting to global warming [J].Economic Journal, 1991, 101(407):938-948. [5] 高鹏飞, 陈文颖.碳税与碳排放[J].清华大学学报(自然科学版), 2002, 42(10):1335-1338.Gao Pengfei, Chen Wenying.Carbon tax and carbon emission[J].Journal of Tsinghua University (Sci & Tech), 2002, 42(10):1335-1338.(in Chinese) [6] Floros N, Vlachou A.Energy demand and energy-related CO₂ emissions in Greek manufacturing:Assessing the impact of a carbon tax [J].Energy Economics, 2005, 27(3):387-413. [7] Cheng F L, Sue J L, Charles, Chang Y F.Effects of carbon taxes on different industries by fuzzy goal programming:A case study of the petrochemical-related industries, Taiwan [J].Energy Policy, 2007, (35):4051-4058. [8] 王金南, 严刚, 姜克隽等.应对气候变化的中国碳税政策研究[J].中国环境科学, 2009, 29(1):101-105.Wang Jinnan, Yan Gang, Jiang Kejun et al.The study on China's carbon tax policy to mitigate climate change[J].China Environmental Science, 2009, 29(1):101-105.(in Chinese) [9] Lu C Y, Tong Q, Liu X M.The impacts of carbon tax and complementary policies on Chinese economy [J].Energy Policy, 2010, 38, 7278-7285. [10] 朱永彬, 刘晓, 王铮.碳税政策的减排效应及其对我国经济的影响分析[J].中国软科学, 2010(4):1-9.Zhu Yongbin, Liu Xiao, Wang Zheng.Abatement effect of carbon tax and its impacts on economy in China[J].China Soft Science Magazine, 2010(4):1-9.(in Chinese) [11] 姚昕, 刘希颖.基于增长视角的中国最优碳税研究[J].经济研究, 2011(11):48-58.Yao Xin, Liu Xiying.Optimal carbon tax in China with the perspective of economic growth[J].Economic Research Journal, 2011(11):48-58.(in Chinese) [12] 刘洁, 李文.征收碳税对中国经济影响的实证[J].中国人口·资源与环境, 2011, 21(9):99-104.Liu Jie, Li Wen.Effects of introduction carbon tax on China's economy[J].China Population, Resources and Environment, 2011, 21(9):99-104.(in Chinese) [13] Baranzni A, Goldemberg J, Speck S.A future for carbon taxes [J].Ecological Economics, 2000, 32(3):395-412. [14] Baker E, Shittu E.Profit-maximizing R&D in response to a random carbon tax[J].Resource and Energy Economics, 2006, 28(2):160-180. [15] Wissema W, Dellink R.AGE analysis of the impact of a carbon energy tax on the Irish economy [J].Ecological Economics, 2007, 61(4):671-683. [16] 聂华林, 周建鹏, 张华.基于减排效应的能源类企业碳税政策的优化选择研究[J].资源科学, 2011, 33 (10):1906-1913.Nie Hualin, Zhou Jianpeng, Zhang Hua.Optimization choices of carbon tax policies for energy enterprises based on effects of carbon emissions reduction[J].Resources Science, 2011, 33 (10):1906-1913.(in Chinese) [17] Yalabik B, Fairchild R J.Customer, regulatory, and competitive pressure as drivers of environmental innovation [J].International Journal of Production Economics, 2011, 131(2):519-527. [18] 李长胜, 范英, 朱磊.基于两阶段博弈模型的钢铁行业碳强度减排机制研究[J].中国管理科学, 2012, 20(2):93-101.Li Changsheng, Fan Ying, Zhu Lei.The study of carbon dioxide emission intensity abatement mechanism of iron and steel industry based on two-stage game model[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, 20(2):93-101.(in Chinese) [19] 宋之杰, 孙其龙.减排视角下企业的最优研发与补贴 [J].科研管理, 2012, 33(10):80-89.Song Zhijie, Sun Qilong.The optimal R&D investment and subsidy under the perspective of emission reduction[J].Science Research Management, 2012, 33(10):80-89.(in Chinese) [20] 付丽苹, 刘爱东.征收碳税对高碳企业转型的激励模型 [J].系统工程, 2012, 30(7):94-98.Fu Liping, Liu Aidong.Modeling the incentive effect of carbon tax policy on the transformation of high carbon-emission enterprises[J].Systems Engineering, 2012, 30(7):94-98.(in Chinese) [21] 李媛, 赵道致, 祝晓光.基于碳税的政府与企业行为博弈模型研究 [J].资源科学, 2013, 35(1):125-131.Li Yuan, Zhao Daozhi, Zhu Xiaoguang.A game model for government and enterprise behavior based on a carbon tax [J].Resources Science, 2013, 35(1):125-131.(in Chinese) [22] Cui T H, Raju J S, Zhang Z J.Fairness and channel coordination [J].Management Science, 2007, 53(8):1303-1314. [23] Raju J S, Zhang Z J.Channel coordination in the presence of a dominant retailer [J].Marketing Science, 2005, 24 (2):254-2621. [24] Cachon G P, Kok A G.Competing manufacturers in a retail supply chain:On contractual form and coordination [J].Management Science, 2010, 56(3):571-589.