Based on explanation and motivation of government intervention in enterprise investment activities, this paper studies the effect of government intervention, property characteristics on enterprise investment efficiency. The results show that: (1) Overall, the government intervention exacerbated overinvestment, but cannot ease underinvestment. (2) Due to property control characteristics, the influence of government intervention on the efficiency of business investment is different. Overinvestment of local state-owned enterprises and underinvestment of private enterprises have maximum sensitivity of the government's intervention. (3) The government intervention ease underinvestment of state-owned enterprises is the results of government investment expansion motivation, and raises the whole investment rate. (4) Further study found out that in the high government intervention area, between overinvestment of the local state-owned enterprises has significant positive correlation to the market value; on the contrary, in the area where marketization develops faster, private enterprise investment has a negative market reaction. As the investment efficiency and value effect are not coincident, the government intervention is a kind of substitution mechanism of market economic transition process.
Key words
government intervention /
institution environment /
property pattern /
capital investment
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