The integrated effect of executive incentives on technology innovation—Empirical research based on high-tech listed companies

Xu Ning; Xu Xiangyi

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Science Research Management ›› 2013, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (9) : 46-53.

The integrated effect of executive incentives on technology innovation—Empirical research based on high-tech listed companies

Xu Ning, Xu Xiangyi

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Abstract

Organizational control theory under the framework of the innovation economics motivates the evolution of the core problem of corporate governance from "Value Distribution" to "Value Creation". This paper redefines and estimates the effect of executive incentives from the dimensions of promoting technological innovation, and conducts an empirical research on the relationship between monetary incentive, equity incentive and control rights incentive and their integrated effect on technology innovation by using the balanced Panel Data from 2007~2010 of Chinese high-tech listed companies. The research result shows that the duel moderating effects of monetary incentive and control rights incentive, equity incentive have a positive effect on the technology innovation. Specifically, there is a complementary relationship between monetary incentive and equity incentive and there is a substitutive relationship between control rights incentive and equity incentive. Therefore, orientated by the technological innovation, a Chinese high-tech company should establish an integration system with executive incentives featuring strengthened equity incentive, stable monetary incentive and weakened control rights incentive.

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Executive incentives / technology innovation / integrated effect

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Xu Ning, Xu Xiangyi. The integrated effect of executive incentives on technology innovation—Empirical research based on high-tech listed companies[J]. Science Research Management. 2013, 34(9): 46-53

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