[1] 温成玉,刘志新.技术并购对高技术上市公司创新绩效的影响[J].科研管理,2011,33(5):1-7. [2] Wright, M., Hoskisson, R.E. and Busenitz, L.W. Firm rebirth: buyouts as facilitators of strategic growth and entrepreneurship[J]. Academy of Management Executive, 2001, 15(1): 111–125. [3] 张治河,周国华,胡锐,谢忠泉.创新学:一个驱动21世纪发展的新兴学科[J].科研管理,2011,33(12):143-156. [4] O' Sullivan M. The innovation enterprise and corporate governance[J]. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2000, 24: 393-416. [5] Hemmer, T., O. Kim, and R. Verrecchia. Introducing convexity into optimal compensation contacts[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1999, 28: 307-327. [6] Chen Ming-yuan. Managerial compensation and R&D investments: the role of the external managerial labour market[J]. International Review of Applied Economics, 2010, 24(5): 553-572. [7] 唐清泉,徐欣,曹媛.股权激励、研发投入与企业可持续发展——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2009(8):77-84. [8] 李春涛,宋敏.中国制造业企业的创新活动:所有制和CEO 激励的作用[J].经济研究,2010(5):55-67. [9] Belloc F. Corporate Governance and Innovation: A survey[J]. Journal of Economic Surveys,2011(1):1-37. [10] 陈冬华,梁上坤,蒋德权.不同市场化进程下高管激励契约的成本与选择:货币薪酬与在职消费[J].会计研究,2010(11):56-64. [11] 孙世敏,王昂,贾剑峰.基于价值创造和动态基础薪酬的经营者激励机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2011(5):153-159. [12] 徐宁,徐向艺.公司治理理论演进趋势研究——基于经济学与法学的整合视角[J].经济与管理研究,2009(12):62-66. [13] 刘金石,王贵.公司治理理论:异同探源、评介与比较[J].经济学动态,2011(5):80-85. [14] Jensen, Michael C, and Meckling, William H. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3(4):305-360. [15] Wu, Jianfeng, and Tu, Runtig. CEO stock option pay and R&D spending:A behavioral agency explanation[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2007, 60(5): 482-492. [16] Lin, C., Lin, P., Song, F., Li, C. Managerial Incentives, CEO Characteristics and Corporate Innovation in China' s Private Sector[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 2011, 39(2):176-190. [17] 张洪辉,夏天,王宗军.公司治理对我国企业创新效率影响实证研究[J].研究与发展管理,2010,22(3):44-50. [18] Dale-Olsen, H. Executive Pay Determination and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from A Compressed Wage Environment[J]. The Manchester School, 2012, 80(3): 355-376. [19] Algrawal A, Knoeber C. Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1996, 31 (3):377-397. [20] Ward, A.J., Brown, J. A., Rodriguez, D. Governance bundles, firm performance, and the substitutability and complementarity of governance mechanisms[J]. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2009, 17(5): 646-660. [21] 黄慧群.控制权作为企业家的激励约束因素:理论分析及现实解释意义[J].经济研究,2000(1):41-47. [22] 姜付秀,黄继承. 经理激励、负债与企业价值[J]. 经济研究,2011(5):46-60. [23] 王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值——基于内生性视角的经验分析[J].管理世界,2006(9):102-116. [24] 任海云.股权结构与企业R&D投入关系的实证研究——基于A股制造业上市公司的数据分析[J].中国软科学,2010(5):126-135. |