Studies on Signaling and screening functions of S&T research performancein academic promotion decision

Abstract

Abstract: With the unverifiable setting of academic quality, whether or not scientists with different academic quality of research performance can be separated efficiently and academic innovation is promoted by performance-based academic promotion is an important reflection of the validity of the academic evaluation system. Based on the theory of information asymmetry, this paper analyzes the effect of unverifiable characteristics of research performance on the academic promotion decision. Furthermore, using framework of signaling theory as well as probit model, the author investigates the effectiveness of research performance to screen scientists with different academic ability and intrinsic motivation of innovation by sampling senior faculty members from public agricultural research institutions. The results of both theoretical and econometrical research show that academic quality of research performance does not fit the criteria considered in the promotion due to its unverifiability; research performance is no more than the scientists' signal of being promoted instead of the references to their academic ability and intrinsic motivation of innovation for underlying academic promotion systems in our country.

Key words: academic promotion, academic performance, signaling, screening

CLC Number:

G311
F062.3

Li Rong. Studies on Signaling and screening functions of S&T research performancein academic promotion decision[J]. Science Research Management, 2013, 34(11): 114-123.

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