By taking two supply chains as a research object, each of them containing one manufacturer and one retailer, the problem involving Stackelberg game is discussed, when two supply chains adopt different decision structures, respectively. In particular, four decision structures between these two supply chains are analyzed, including the structures of decentralized-decentralized, decentralized-centralized, centralized- decentralized, centralized-centralized. It is found that (1) centralized decision is the dominate strategy for the leader supply chain;(2) as for the follower supply chain, whether adopting centralized decision or decentralized decision, it is depended on the substitutability degree of products and the selection of the leader supply chain; (3) when the substitutability degree of product is low, the structure of centralized-centralized is the equilibrium solution of single and repeat games; and when the substitutability degree of product is high, the structure of centralized-decentralized is the equilibrium solution of single game; while the structure of decentralized -decentralized is the equilibrium solution of repeat games.
Key words
multi-supply chains /
price competition /
decision /
Stackelberg game
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