Science Research Management ›› 2012, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (12): 50-58.

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The decision model of vertical structure under Stackelberg game among supply chains

Li Baixun1, Zhou Yongwu2, Wang Shengdong3   

  1. 1. School of Business Administration, Guangdong University of Business, Guangzhou 510320, China;
    2. School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, China;
    3. Department of Mathematics, Electronic Engineering Institute of PLA, Hefei 230037, China
  • Received:2010-10-13 Revised:2011-01-12 Online:2012-12-27 Published:2012-12-17

Abstract: By taking two supply chains as a research object, each of them containing one manufacturer and one retailer, the problem involving Stackelberg game is discussed, when two supply chains adopt different decision structures, respectively. In particular, four decision structures between these two supply chains are analyzed, including the structures of decentralized-decentralized, decentralized-centralized, centralized- decentralized, centralized-centralized. It is found that (1) centralized decision is the dominate strategy for the leader supply chain;(2) as for the follower supply chain, whether adopting centralized decision or decentralized decision, it is depended on the substitutability degree of products and the selection of the leader supply chain; (3) when the substitutability degree of product is low, the structure of centralized-centralized is the equilibrium solution of single and repeat games; and when the substitutability degree of product is high, the structure of centralized-decentralized is the equilibrium solution of single game; while the structure of decentralized -decentralized is the equilibrium solution of repeat games.

Key words: multi-supply chains, price competition, decision, Stackelberg game

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