Research on the evolutionary game in which S&T leading enterprises lead the innovation consortium to make continuous breakthroughs in key core technologies

Yuan Ye, Zhao Yuying, Yin Ximing

Science Research Management ›› 2026, Vol. 47 ›› Issue (3) : 93-105.

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Science Research Management ›› 2026, Vol. 47 ›› Issue (3) : 93-105. DOI: 10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2026.03.010  CSTR: 32148.14.kygl.2026.03.010

Research on the evolutionary game in which S&T leading enterprises lead the innovation consortium to make continuous breakthroughs in key core technologies

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Abstract

Promoting the deep integration of S&T innovation and industrial innovation through an enterprise-led innovation consortium is the key to make breakthroughs in key core technologies and accelerate the development of new quality productive forces. Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper used the Matlab software to simulate and analyze the strategy selection of innovation subjects under changes in different parameters,revealing the dynamic evolution law according to which the S&T leading enterprises lead innovation consortium to make continuous breakthroughs in key core technologies. The research found that: (1) The government's willingness of participation is a critical factor influencing the cooperation among the innovation consortium members,with a particularly significant impact on S&T leading enterprises;Enhancing the participation willingness of S&T leading enterprises can influence the enthusiasm of member units to some extent,while conversely,increasing the participation willingness of member units has a minimal effect on the strategic choices of the government and S&T leading enterprises;(2) Compared with the incentive mechanism,a reasonable punishment mechanism can more effectively promote the continued participation and enthusiasm of each member of the innovation consortium in key core technology research;(3) The income from the transformation of S&T achievements significantly impacts the enthusiasm of the innovation consortium members to continue participating in key core technology research,with a particularly pronounced effect on S&T leading enterprises;(4) When all the subjects of the innovation consortium adopt a positive strategy,the willingness of S&T leading enterprises to participate increases with the increase of the success probability of the key core technology breakthroughs. However,if only one party is actively innovating,the other party are unlikely to choose active innovation,and the government will not choose a strategy that is highly involved in support. Finally,this paper proposed the following countermeasures and suggestions: strengthening a well-functioning government,improving an efficient market,cultivating powerful subjects,and building a tolerant society within an integrated four-in-one collaborative system. These measures will empower the innovation consortium led by S&T leading enterprises,stimulate the innovation vitality of multiple subjects,achieve continuous breakthroughs in key core technologies,and cultivate new quality productive forces and new kinetic energy.

Key words

S&T powerhouse / new quality productive forces / S&T leading enterprise / innovation consortium / key core technology / evolutionary game

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Yuan Ye , Zhao Yuying , Yin Ximing. Research on the evolutionary game in which S&T leading enterprises lead the innovation consortium to make continuous breakthroughs in key core technologies[J]. Science Research Management. 2026, 47(3): 93-105 https://doi.org/10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2026.03.010

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