专利质押对企业技术创新的影响研究

doi:10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2024.06.018

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 有效破解知识产权质押融资难题，对于金融支持中小企业创新和培育“专精特新”企业具有重要意义。本文基于融资约束和信息不对称理论，探究专利质押对企业技术创新的影响机制和约束条件，并构建2006—2018年地级市层面的企业专利质押和创新绩效面板数据，采用双向固定效应模型和工具变量法进行实证检验。结果发现：专利质押能显著促进企业技术创新，这一正向影响主要体现在非上市公司。专利质押可通过发挥专利的担保价值，缓解企业融资约束，以及促进担保价值和知识价值的转化，实现双向信号机制，激励企业技术创新。在专利市场可交易性和知识产权保护力度更强的条件下，专利质押对企业创新的促进作用更显著。本文从双向信号激励的视角丰富了专利质押促进创新的机制研究，也为打通金融机构服务链条堵点，探索金融赋能“专精特新”企业高质量发展的路径提供政策参考。

关键词: 专利质押, 技术创新, 融资约束, 双向信号机制

Abstract: Solving effectively the difficulties in intellectual property collateralized financing is of paramount significance for providing financial support to the technological innovation of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and nurturing specialized and new enterprises (SNEs). To this end, based on the theories of financing constraints and asymmetric information, this paper explored the effects, underlying mechanisms and conditions of patent pledge in fostering enterprise technological innovation. Drawing on panel data of enterprise patent pledge and technological innovation at the prefecture-level from 2006 to 2018, and using a two-way fixed effects model and instrumental variable method, we empirically investigated the effects of patent pledge on enterprise technological innovation. The results showed that patent pledge significantly promotes enterprise technological innovation, and this positive effect was primarily manifested among non-listed enterprises. The mechanism tests revealed that patent pledge can leverage the collateral value of patents, easing enterprise financing constraints. Simultaneously, patent collateral facilitates the mutual conversion of collateral value and information value, forming a two-way signaling mechanism, both of which are conducive to promoting technological innovation. Under conditions of greater tradability in the patent market and stronger intellectual property protection, the positive effect of patent collateral on enterprise technological innovation becomes more pronounced. This paper has not only enriched the study on the mechanism of patent pledge promoting innovation from the perspective of two-way signaling incentive, but also provided policy insights for unblocking bottlenecks in the financial services chain and exploring pathways for financial empowerment of SNEs to achieve high-quality development.

Key words: patent pledge, technological innovation, financing constraint, twoway signaling mechanism

袁礼, 周燕, 戴鹏毅. 专利质押对企业技术创新的影响研究[J]. 科研管理, 2024, 45(6): 174-182.

Yuan Li, Zhou Yan, Dai Pengyi. Research on the impact of patent pledges on technological innovation in enterprises[J]. Science Research Management, 2024, 45(6): 174-182.

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