Science Research Management ›› 2025, Vol. 46 ›› Issue (7): 123-131.DOI: 10.19571/j.cnki.1000-2995.2025.07.012

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Research on the influence of government subsidies on the technical game between agents in the innovation ecosystem

Zhou Zhong, Fu Shengjun, Ban Yi   

  1. School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Institute of Technology, Shanghai 200237, China
  • Received:2023-11-15 Revised:2024-12-23 Online:2025-07-20 Published:2025-07-14

Abstract:      It is a common practice for the government to support specific enterprises and promote industrial development by means of selective subsidies. The impact and mechanism of this move on the technological strategies of different entities within the innovation ecosystem are important issues worthy of research. This paper adopted the leading enterprises and the following enterprises in the innovation ecosystem as the research objects, constructed an evolutionary game model to analyze the game relationship and stable strategies of both sides, and further applied the Netlogo software for simulation to study the impact of the government′s selective subsidies and tax preferences under different intensities on the technological strategy game of the two types of entities. The research findings are as follows: Firstly, there are three evolutionary stable strategies in the technological strategy game between the leading enterprises and the following enterprises. Moderately increasing the intensity of government subsidies and patent protection can prompt the leading enterprises to adopt patent protection measures and stimulate the following enterprises to carry out innovation. Secondly, the intensity of selective subsidies has a nonlinear impact on the choice of enterprise technological strategies. Flexibly adjusting the subsidy intensity has a positive effect on enterprises′ adoption of optimal technological strategies and the creation of a stable market environment. Thirdly, compared with government subsidies, tax preferences can better prompt enterprises to choose optimal technological strategies. Diversified and refined subsidy policies can guide the development direction of enterprises more accurately. The research conclusions will expand and deepen the theoretical research on the impact of government subsidies on the technological game among innovation entities from the perspective of innovation ecosystem, and provide important implications for government departments to flexibly adjust and precisely optimize subsidy policies so as to accelerate the guidance of industrial development.

Key words: selective subsidy, innovation ecosystem, technical game, multi-agent simulation