Game-theoretic analyses on distribution capability for online retailers and logistics providers

Abstract

Abstract: Considering the volatility of network selling and the characteristics of logistic service in E-commerce environments, a game model about distribution capability consisted of one online retailer and one logistics provider was established by introducing additional cost sharing factor. The paper discussed the equilibrium solution and its relationship with related parameters in the case of non-cooperation and cooperation respectively. The analysis and argumentation showed that the online retailer would not share the additional cost of logistics providers in a completely independent decision-making. Then, in the Stackelberg game, the online retailer earned more, but the profit of logistics provider was improved based on certain conditions. Furthermore, the best overall revenue of supply chain was achieved in the cooperative game, and the equilibrium with Pareto improvement solution was proved by regulating the extra cost sharing proportion.

Key words: e-business, logistics distribution, stackelberg game, cooperative game

CLC Number:

F252.3

Ding Bin, Luo Qiuhui. Game-theoretic analyses on distribution capability for online retailers and logistics providers[J]. Science Research Management, 2014, 35(3): 140-146.

References

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